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“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury . . . .”1
INTRODUCTION
Every day, defendants in federal courts waive grand jury
indictment, usually in the process of pleading guilty. Waiver of
indictment, permitted by Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (FRCP) since 1946, enhances the efficiency of the
federal criminal process by facilitating and expediting guilty
pleas and the commencement of sentences, by preserving court
and prosecutorial resources, and by permitting defendants to
use their willingness to forgo grand jury indictment as leverage
when plea bargaining. Waiver of adjudicatory criminal procedural rights typically promotes the efficient adjudication of
guilt and produces practical benefits for the court system, the
government, and, in some cases, the individual defendant. Furthermore, because such rights usually are understood to be in
the manner of a personal privilege of the defendant rather than
a prerequisite to the jurisdiction of the court, waiver generally
is deemed proper from a constitutional standpoint.
However, the dominant view in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries acknowledged a nexus between the Fifth
Amendment right to grand jury indictment and a federal
court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a criminal matter. In fact, a
valid grand jury indictment was thought to be a prerequisite to
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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the exercise of federal criminal jurisdiction. Therefore, a federal
defendant could not waive or forfeit the right to grand jury indictment for an infamous crime, because without an indictment
a federal court had no jurisdiction over a criminal case.
Although federal courts for the first 150 years of U.S. constitutional history viewed the right to grand jury indictment as
having jurisdictional significance, the promulgation of the controversial provision for waiver of grand jury indictment in Rule
7 of the 1946 FRCP reflected the view that the right to grand
jury indictment is just another waivable criminal procedural
right, unrelated to a court’s power to hear a case. This modern
view was recently affirmed by the Supreme Court.2
The shift in judicial understanding about the relationship
of grand jury indictment and jurisdiction came about not as the
result of a constitutional amendment or a novel interpretation
by the Supreme Court of the Grand Jury Clause; the rejection
of the jurisdictional significance of the grand jury is, at bottom,
the direct result of the rejection of formalist and mechanical
approaches to criminal procedure during a larger project of
criminal law reform in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. The reformers saw the grand jury as an ineffective
protector of individual liberty and, more importantly, as an unnecessary obstacle to the procedural efficiency to which they
aspired.
Placing practical concerns at the forefront, these reformers
were able to obscure the “jurisdictional heritage” of the grand
jury and push through—over serious constitutional objections—
a provision for waiver of grand jury indictment as part of the
promulgation of the FRCP. Rule 7’s waiver provision seemingly
achieved the goal of efficiency, but it did so without full consideration of the role the Grand Jury Clause might play in the
constitutional framework governing criminal cases. However, a
half century later, Apprendi v. New Jersey3 and its progeny
prompted a more granular analysis of the function of grand
jury indictment in the framework of criminal procedural rights.
In the process, the serious flaws of the modern understanding
of the grand jury were laid bare.
This Article recovers the jurisdictional heritage of the
grand jury and argues that the modern understanding is contradicted by the weight of the compelling and, thus far, largely
2. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002).
3. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

FAIRFAX_4FMT

2006]

12/22/2006 11:01:15 AM

JURISDICTIONAL HERITAGE

401

ignored historical evidence of the grand jury’s jurisdictional
significance. The modern view undervalues the rich history of
the nexus between grand jury indictment and subject matter
jurisdiction in federal criminal cases as a result of the legal realist procedural reform project of the early twentieth century
and its failure to reconcile its pragmatic view of the grand jury
requirement with the jurisdictional heritage of the Grand Jury
Clause. To this day, there has been no considered judgment regarding what the jurisdictional significance of the grand jury
might mean for the protection of individual liberty. In short,
the reformers made short shrift of the jurisdictional heritage of
the grand jury and the Supreme Court, relying on flawed legal
and historical analysis, has failed to correct the course. As a result, we remain frustrated in our understanding of the proper
role of the grand jury in the constitutional design.
Part I of the Article previews the central arguments militating against the jurisdictional import of the grand jury, some
of which were recently endorsed by the Supreme Court. Part II
argues that the federal grand jury indeed boasts a “jurisdictional heritage” worthy of acknowledgement as we consider the
contours of the continuing role of the grand jury in the structure of the U.S. Constitution. After a brief treatment of the origins, history, and development of the grand jury in the United
States, Part II examines case law and contemporary commentary demonstrating that a grand jury indictment was, for the
first 150 years of our constitutional history, a mandatory prerequisite to a federal trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a
criminal case. Part II also defends this jurisdictional heritage
against the modern pragmatic critique that dismisses the jurisdictional significance of the grand jury.
Part III examines the criminal procedural reform project of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which
showed little respect for the jurisdictional heritage of the grand
jury. These reformers, who shared significant philosophical
common ground with the legal realists, sought to discard the
formalism of the English and nineteenth century American approaches to the initiation and adjudication of criminal cases,
and targeted the institution of the grand jury for reform and
even abolition. This campaign for functionalism over formalism
in criminal procedure planted the seeds for the drafting and
adoption—despite serious constitutional concerns—of the 1946
FRCP’s provision for waiver of indictment in federal criminal
cases. Part III concludes that the legal realist criminal proce-
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dural reform project of the early twentieth century, with its attack on the inefficiency and formalism, may have subverted the
mandate of the Grand Jury Clause.
These successful efforts to promulgate a waiver provision,
as Part IV explains, may have been undertaken for wholly legitimate and desirable policy purposes, but they failed to satisfactorily address serious doubts raised regarding the constitutionality of the indictment waiver. As a result, the questions of
jurisdictional significance of the grand jury remained and continued to confound courts into the twenty-first century. The result is the weakly supported consensus at which we have arrived today—one that is flawed, uninformed by the historical
evidence, and vulnerable to future constitutional challenges
with respect to important procedural efficiency tools such as
pre-indictment plea bargaining. After highlighting the implications of this uncertainty and contextualizing them within the
broader discussion of the role of pragmatism and originalism in
criminal procedure jurisprudence, Part IV discusses the ways
in which an earnest assessment of the grand jury’s jurisdictional heritage may help us to transform the modern grand jury
into a more efficacious protection of liberty.
The Article concludes with a call for work on a new theory
of the relationship between the right to grand jury indictment
and the exercise of federal criminal jurisdiction—one that balances important constitutional and practical considerations by
both acknowledging the “jurisdictional heritage” of grand jury
indictment and allowing for efficiency-promoting tools such as
waiver of indictment.
I. THE MODERN REJECTION OF THE GRAND JURY’S
JURISDICTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE
If the existence of a valid grand jury indictment were a
mandatory, non-waivable prerequisite to a federal district
court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a (felony) criminal case,
then the absence of a valid grand jury indictment would deprive a district court of jurisdiction over the case. This result
would follow regardless of whether the defendant waives the
right to indictment, an indictment is never found by a grand
jury, or the indictment is fatally defective in some way.4 The
4. Indictment defects can take a number of forms, ranging from failure to
provide notice of charges as required by the Sixth Amendment to the failure of
the indictment to reflect the Fifth Amendment due process “screening” func-
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Supreme Court, in United States v. Cotton, recently rejected the
aforementioned premise that there is a relationship between
grand jury indictment and federal criminal jurisdiction.5 In so
doing, the Court revealed some of the central misunderstandings at the core of the question of whether the federal grand
jury boasts a jurisdictional heritage.
Just prior to Cotton, the watershed case of Apprendi v. New
Jersey6 helped to expose a fault line in our understanding of the
relationship of grand jury indictment and jurisdiction. In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that any fact that increases the
punishment for a crime in a way that exceeds the statutory
maximum for that crime must be charged in the indictment
and determined by the fact-finder beyond a reasonable doubt.7
This monumental ruling led to challenges by defendants convicted of federal crimes for which they received an enhanced
sentence based on a sentencing judge’s determination, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant’s conduct
qualified in some way for an enhancement under the United
States Sentencing Guidelines or a statutory provision.8

tion that the grand jury alone is meant to perform (e.g., where a court alters
an indictment at trial in some material way). Benjamin E. Rosenberg, The
Analysis of Defective Indictments After United States v. Cotton, 41 CRIM. L.
BULL. 463, 463, 465–66 (2005). For purposes of this Article, regardless of the
type of defect, when courts treat the flaw as rendering the purported indictment a nullity, the defect is fatal. Cf. Peter G. Ballou, “Jurisdictional” Indictments, Informations and Complaints: An Unnecessary Doctrine, 29 ME. L. REV.
1, 21 (1977) (reflecting the assumption that “failure of an indictment to charge
an offense is the equivalent of no indictment at all”).
5. 535 U.S. at 631.
6. 530 U.S. 466.
7. Id. at 490.
8. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 746 (2005); Blakely
v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2535 (2004). Blakely extended the Apprendi
rule to the statutory guidelines context, holding that the Sixth Amendment
requires that juries—not judges—must find facts necessary to impose an enhanced sentence, even if the sentence remains within the statutory maximum.
See id. at 2537–38. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court extended the
Blakely reasoning to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, see Booker, 125 S. Ct.
at 751, but saved the Guidelines by severing the provisions that had made
them mandatory and by setting forth standards of review on appeal. See id. at
755–56, 764; see also Craig Green, Booker and Fanfan: The Untimely Death
(and Rebirth?) of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 93 GEO. L.J. 395, 395
(2005) (describing the Court’s rejection of mandatory use of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines); David Yellen, Saving Federal Sentencing After Apprendi,
Blakely, and Booker, 50 VILL. L. REV. 163, 163–64 (2005) (detailing the Apprendi line of cases). As a result, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines remain,
but are advisory. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756–67.
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One such challenge came in Cotton. Cotton, along with
seven others, was indicted for and convicted of a single count of
conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute
cocaine hydrochloride and cocaine base.9 Neither the indictment nor the verdict form specified a particular quantity of
narcotics to be attributed to the conspiracy or the various coconspirators.10 However, based on its finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, regarding various quantities of cocaine
base attributed to each co-conspirator, the district court sentenced Cotton and six of his seven co-conspirators to a term of
imprisonment greater than the twenty year maximum penalty
provided for when there exists “an unspecified quantity” of cocaine base.11 Cotton and the others appealed on a number of
grounds, including the argument that because a specific
threshold drug quantity was neither alleged in the indictment
nor found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, the enhanced
sentence punished them for a crime with which they were neither charged nor convicted, in violation of Apprendi.12
The Fourth Circuit agreed, holding that “the district court
exceeded its jurisdiction in sentencing the appellants for a
crime with which they were never charged, thus depriving
them of the constitutional right to ‘answer’ only for those
crimes presented to the grand jury.”13 The court explained that
“because an indictment setting forth all the essential elements
of an offense is both mandatory and jurisdictional, and a ‘defendant cannot be “held to answer” for any offense not charged
in an indictment returned by a grand jury,’ a court is without

9. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 627–28.
10. Id. at 628.
11. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (2000). Cotton and four of his coconspirators had over 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base attributed to them and,
thus, were sentenced to life imprisonment. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 628. Two other
co-conspirators received sentences of thirty years imprisonment. Id. In imposing these sentences, the district court relied on 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii),
which allows for a maximum sentence of life in prison for offenses involving
fifty grams or more of cocaine base. Id. However, for offenses involving unspecified quantities of cocaine base, the maximum penalty is twenty years. 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C); Cotton, 535 U.S. at 628.
12. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 624–25.
13. United States v. Cotton, 261 F.3d 397, 405 (4th Cir. 2001); see also id.
at 404 (“[W]hen an indictment fails to set forth an ‘essential element of a
crime,’ ‘[t]he court . . . ha[s] no jurisdiction to try [a defendant] under that
count of the indictment.’” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Hooker, 841 F.2d 1225, 1232–33 (4th Cir. 1988))).
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‘jurisdiction to . . . impose a sentence for an offense not charged
in the indictment.’”14
The Supreme Court reversed.15 Rejecting the Fourth Circuit’s view, the Court held that a defective indictment does not
deprive a court of jurisdiction.16 The Court explained that the
Fourth Circuit view had originated in the nineteenth century
case of Ex parte Bain,17 in which the Court granted a petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus on the ground that an allegation
had been stricken from the indictment, thus depriving the court
of jurisdiction over the matter.18 Although the grand jury had
returned an indictment against the defendant, the alteration of
that charging document by the trial court rendered that indictment a nullity—as if it had never existed—and, therefore,
the Bain Court reasoned, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction over the matter.19
The Cotton Court explained that the Bain decision arose in
an era in which the Supreme Court had relatively little authority to review criminal convictions.20 In 1887, the Court could
only review a criminal conviction pursuant to a writ of habeas
corpus and, then, only when the court of conviction had no jurisdiction over the matter.21 This narrow ability to review
criminal convictions only on habeas review and only for jurisdictional defects led the Bain Court to adopt, what Cotton described as, “a ‘somewhat expansive notion of jurisdiction,’”22
which “was ‘more a fiction than anything else.’”23 According to
the Cotton Court, “Bain’s elastic concept of jurisdiction is not
what the term ‘jurisdiction’ means today, i.e., ‘the court’s statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.’”24
14. Id. at 404–05 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Tran,
234 F.3d 798, 808 (2d Cir. 2000)). The court also found that the failure to
charge the drug quantity in the indictment satisfied the plain error standard.
See id. at 406–07.
15. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 634.
16. See id. at 631.
17. 121 U.S. 1 (1887), overruled by Cotton, 535 U.S. 625.
18. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631.
19. See Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. at 13 (“[T]he jurisdiction of the offence
[was] gone, and the court [had] no right to proceed any further in the progress
of the case for want of an indictment.”).
20. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 629.
21. Id. at 629–30.
22. Id. at 630 (quoting Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 494 (1994)).
23. Id. (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 79 (1977)).
24. Id. (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89
(1998)). The Court pointed out that subject-matter jurisdiction “can never be
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Analyzing selected post-Bain twentieth century cases, the
Court concluded that “defects in an indictment do not deprive a
court of its power to adjudicate a case,”25 and, “[i]nsofar as it
held that a defective indictment deprives a court of jurisdiction,
Bain is overruled.”26 The Cotton Court also contrasted “subjectmatter jurisdiction,” which “involves a court’s power to hear a
case” and “can never be forfeited or waived,” with the “grand
jury right,” which “can be waived.”27 Notably, the Court did not
advance a rationale for the constitutionality of waiver of grand
jury indictment.28

forfeited or waived” and, therefore, “defects in subject-matter jurisdiction require correction regardless of whether the error was raised in district court.”
Id. (citing Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908)). The
Court contrasted subject-matter jurisdiction, which cannot be waived, with the
grand jury right, which can be waived. Id. (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(b); Smith
v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 6 (1959)).
25. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631. The cases the courts cited for this proposition,
United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 58 (1951), and Lamar v. United States, 240
U.S. 60 (1916), do not ultimately support this position. In Williams, the question was whether a defendant could be convicted of perjury when the alleged
false statement took place before a court entertaining a faulty indictment. 341
U.S. at 61. There, the Court’s discussion was highly contextual and chiefly
concerned with whether a perjury defendant would be able to escape criminal
liability by collaterally challenging the jurisdiction of the court before which
he or she lied. Id. at 65. Aside from the fact that the Court was dealing with
murky and context-specific questions, the analysis in no way touched upon the
impact on a court’s jurisdiction where there is no indictment at all. See id. at
65–69. Likewise, in Lamar, the Court’s analysis focused on the distinct question of whether an objection to an indictment on the grounds that it does not
charge a crime is an issue of merits or jurisdiction. 240 U.S. at 64. These cases
do not counter the principle set forth in Ex parte Bain that a grand jury indictment is a mandatory prerequisite to a federal court’s exercise of jurisdiction in a criminal case. See Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 13 (1887), overruled by
United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002).
26. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631. The Court went on to hold that the failure of
the indictment to allege a specific drug quantity did not meet the plain error
test. Id. at 633–34.
27. Id. at 630 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(b); Smith v. United States, 360
U.S. 1, 6 (1959)).
28. The Court cited only FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(b), the rule allowing for waiver
of indictment, and Smith, 360 U.S. 1, for the proposition that the right to
grand jury indictment may be waived. Rule 7(b) was promulgated over serious
constitutional objections that the rulemakers failed to answer. See infra Part
III. The Smith Court advanced no constitutional rationale for waiver of indictment in the face of the jurisdictional mandate of the Grand Jury Clause,
but rather relied on district court and circuit court opinions construing Rule
7(a) to allow for waiver in non-capital cases. 360 U.S. at 6–9. Missing from this
waiver analysis is any rebuttal of the nineteenth century view that grand jury
indictment is a mandatory prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction—a con-
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Whether due to misconstruction or legerdemain, the Supreme Court in Cotton squandered an opportunity to clarify the
relationship between grand jury indictment and jurisdiction. To
be sure, the Cotton decision was chiefly focused on the question
of whether an Apprendi error in an indictment gave rise to a
jurisdictional defect sufficient to satisfy plain error review.29
However, the Court, of necessity, also made certain observations about the relationship of grand jury indictment and jurisdiction beyond that narrow question.30 Two distinct statements
germane to the question of whether there is a relationship between grand jury indictment and jurisdiction can be gleaned
from the Supreme Court’s decision in Cotton. First, the notion
that grand jury indictment and jurisdiction are linked is a
nineteenth century fiction.31 Second, FRCP 7’s provision for
waiver of indictment means that there can be no relationship
between indictment and jurisdiction, as jurisdiction can never
be waived.32
Cotton is evidence that the reform movement of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries succeeded in challenging the continued usefulness of the institution of the grand
jury and promoting, without serious constitutional scrutiny,
what the reformers saw as practical improvements in the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts.33 The reformers’ success was realized despite the fact that their efforts
surrounding the waiver provision labored against the weight of
the historical evidence which established the jurisdictional significance of the right to grand jury indictment.34 The failure of
the Supreme Court to analyze fairly the “jurisdictional heritage” of the grand jury works a disservice to an accurate assessment of the proper place of the grand jury in our constitutional structure, and to long overdue efforts to fashion muchneeded improvements to the federal grand jury.

straint on the court’s jurisdiction that could not be defeated by consent of the
defendant. See id. at 6–10.
29. See, e.g., Joshua A.T. Fairfield, To Err Is Human: The Judicial Conundrum of Curing Apprendi Error, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 889, 921–26 (2003).
30. See Cotton, 535 U.S. at 629–31.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 630.
33. For a description of the reform movement, see infra Part III.
34. See infra Part II.B–C.
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II. RECOVERING THE JURISDICTIONAL HERITAGE OF
THE GRAND JURY
An examination of the early understanding of the grand
jury’s role in our constitutional system yields a much different
picture than that painted by the Court in Cotton. There can be
no denying that the grand jury is an institution rich in jurisdictional significance. Indeed, grand jury indictment, for the first
century and a half of U.S. constitutional history, was a mandatory prerequisite to a federal trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction in a criminal case; without a valid grand jury indictment,
there was no felony criminal case for a federal court to entertain.
A. LESSONS FROM ENGLAND AND THE FOUNDING
The right to grand jury indictment in federal felony criminal prosecutions flows from the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution.35 However, the grand jury itself, “rooted in long centuries of Anglo-American history,”36 is
“an ancient institution of the common law,”37 the heritage of
which may go back as far as Athens,38 but safely can be traced
back to the fourteenth century reign of Edward III, when “the
modern practice of returning a panel of twenty-four men to inquire for the county was established and the body then received
the name ‘le graunde inquest.’”39 During the first three centu35. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury. . . .”). For a broad introduction to the history, role, and function of
the grand jury, see SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE
(2d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2005).
36. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992) (quoting Hannah v.
Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 490 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result)).
37. United States v. Gill, 55 F.2d 399, 400 (D.N.M. 1931) (citing 4 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION
AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF
THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA (Rothman Reprints 1969) (1803); Charge to
Grand Jury, 2 Sawy. 667 (1872), reprinted in 30 Fed. Cas. 992 (1897)).
38. GEORGE J. EDWARDS, THE GRAND JURY: AN ESSAY 1 (1906).
39. Id. at 2. Two centuries prior, Henry II’s reign was responsible for the
Constitutions of Clarendon and the Assize of Clarendon. M.M. KNAPPEN, CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 185–86 (1942); Ric Simmons,
Re-Examining the Grand Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in the Criminal
Justice System?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2002). These documents laid the
groundwork for what would become the grand jury. See id. at 5. The Constitutions of Clarendon (1164) offered to a layperson who was being charged in an
ecclesiastical court the protection of a state-governed “accusing jury” when no
public accuser had made charges against him or her. Id. at 4. This provision
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ries of the grand jury’s use in England, it served largely the interests of the monarchy,40 although by the seventeenth century
English grand juries had begun to stand between the Crown
and accused subjects as a protection against unwarranted accusation.41 Eventually, the law required a valid indictment by a
grand jury before a court could try a defendant for certain
classes of crime.42 English history demonstrates that the grand
jury was transformed from merely an arm of the Crown into a
protector of individual liberty. Absent a grand jury indictment,
English courts were powerless to try a defendant for certain serious crimes, irrespective of the wishes of the Crown.43
The grand jury institution followed the English common
law to the American colonies and quickly established itself as a
was designed to stem the common practice of bringing a layperson before an
ecclesiastical court based solely on a secret, private accusation. Id. at 4 n.9.
Here, the layperson was afforded in certain situations “twelve lawful men of
the neighborhood or the town to swear in the presence of the bishop, that they
will make manifest the truth in the matter, according to their conscience.”
Constitutions of Clarendon, ch. 6, reprinted in SELECT DOCUMENTS OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 11, 12 (George B. Adams & H. Morse Stephens
eds., 1920). The Assize of Clarendon (1166) established a purely accusatory
body comprised of twelve men out of every one-hundred in a particular town,
who were selected to reveal, under oath, whether any local residents had
committed a crime. EDWARDS, supra note 38, at 7. The accused individuals
were said to be “presented” by the accusatory jury for trial on the accusations.
See id.; JUDICIAL TRIBUNALS IN ENGLAND AND EUROPE, 1200–1700, at 9 (Maureen Mulholland & Brian Pullan eds., 2003).
40. See Simmons, supra note 39, at 6.
41. A commonly cited example of this phenomenon can be found in certain
grand juries’ refusal to indict in cases brought against Stephen Colledge and
Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Earl of Shaftesbury. See EDWARDS, supra note 38,
at 28–30; Mark Kadish, Behind the Locked Door of an American Grand Jury:
Its History, Its Secrecy, and Its Process, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1996);
Simmons, supra note 39, at 8.
42. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL
90–92 (2003); BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND PROBABLE CAUSE: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF
EVIDENCE 91 (1991); see also Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 556 (1884)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (observing that by the time the American colonies
were established, there existed “‘an informing and accusing tribunal [ . . .],
without whose previous action no person charged with a felony could, except in
certain special cases, be put upon his trial’” (quoting Charge to Grand Jury, 30
F. Cas. 992, 993 (C.C.D. Cal. 1872)) (alteration in original)).
43. See Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 543 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“If a man were
to commit a capital offense in the face of all the judges of England, their
united authority could not put him upon his trial . . . .”) (citation omitted)); see
also Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 423 (1885) (“By the law of England, informations by the Attorney General without the intervention of a grand jury
were not allowed . . . .”).
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buffer between the colonists and the King.44 The grand jury indictment was not only a prerequisite to serious criminal
charges in many colonies, but the grand jury was woven into
the fabric of everyday colonial life.45 Colonial grand juries also
played a part in expressing colonists’ dissatisfaction with the
exercise of monarchical power by nullifying attempted prosecutions of critics of the Crown and aggressively issuing “angry
and well-publicized presentments and indictments”46 against
representatives of the Crown.47
The role of the grand jury in the colonies gave it “enhanced
prestige”48 and special respect among American colonists during the pre-Revolution period. After the Revolution, the colonists remained aware of the power and potential threat posed
by any central governing authority.49 As a result, the right to
indictment by grand jury was a topic of discussion among

44. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHT OF MANKIND: A HISTORY
OF THE AMERICAN BILL OF RIGHTS 24 (1992) [hereinafter SCHWARTZ, THE
GREAT RIGHT]; Susan W. Brenner, The Voice of the Community: A Case for
Grand Jury Independence, 3 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 67, 70 (1995). Although the

earliest colonial grand jury was established in 1635, Kadish, supra note 41, at
9, probably the first mention of the grand jury right in the American colonial
experience can be found in the 1683 New York Charter of Libertyes and
Priviledges. See 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 163 (1971). The Charter, which was passed by the first elected assembly of the colony of New York, provided that “[i]n all Cases Capitall or
Criminall there shall be a grand Inquest who shall first present the offence.”
Id. at 166.
45. In addition to performing the traditional accusatory function, colonial
grand juries often addressed matters of local concern including overseeing
community infrastructure and public works projects, taxing and spending, and
the appointment of individuals to local office. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS
OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 221–23 (1999); Kadish, supra note 41, at 10–11; Simmons, supra note 39, at 10–11.
46. Renée B. Lettow, Note, Reviving Federal Grand Jury Presentments,
103 YALE L.J. 1333, 1337 (1994).
47. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 84–86 (1998) [hereinafter AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS]; Kadish, supra
note 41, at 11.
48. Lettow, supra note 46, at 1337; see also SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHT,
supra note 44, at 76–77 (noting that North Carolina Declaration of Rights,
adopted in 1776, contained a guarantee of right to indictment and, thus, was
the “direct precursor” to the Fifth Amendment’s Grand Jury Clause); H.L.
McClintock, Indictment by a Grand Jury, 26 MINN. L. REV. 153, 156 (1942).
49. See SUSAN W. BRENNER & GREGORY G. LOCKHART, FEDERAL GRAND
JURY PRACTICE § 2.1, at 4–6 (1996); LEROY D. CLARK, THE GRAND JURY: THE
USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL POWER 19–20 (1975); Simmons, supra note 39,
at 12–13.
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states deliberating the ratification of the Constitution.50 Ratifying conventions from such influential states as Massachusetts,
New York, and New Hampshire considered amendments to the
newly drafted Constitution that would have established the
right to grand jury indictment.51
The Constitution as originally ratified, however, made no
mention of grand juries.52 Not until the ratification of the Fifth
Amendment in 1791 as part of the Bill of Rights was the grand
jury enshrined in the Constitution:53 “No person shall be held

50. See ALFREDO GARCIA, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT: A COMPREHENSIVE
APPROACH 23 (2002); RICHARD D. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE’S PANEL: THE
GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1634–1941, at 45–46 (1963) [hereinafter
YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE’S PANEL].
51. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES,
AND ORIGINS 278 (Neil H. Cogan ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1997) (1788) [hereinafter THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS]; SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHT, supra
note 44, at 128–29, 147–48, 157–58; YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE’S PANEL, supra
note 50 at 45–46. One of the amendments proposed by the Massachusetts ratifying convention provided “[t]hat no person shall be tried for any Crime by
which he may incur an infamous punishment or loss of life until he be first indicted by a Grand Jury, except in such cases as may arise in the Government
and regulation of the Land and Naval forces.” THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES 218 (Ralph Ketcham ed.,
Penguin Books 1986) (1788). New Hampshire’s provision was virtually identical. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra, at 278. New York proposed
that “a Presentment or Indictment by a Grand Jury ought to be observed as a
necessary preliminary to the trial of all Crimes cognizable by the Judiciary of
the United States . . . .” Id.
52. See EDWARDS, supra note 38, at 32. There was a mention of indictment in Article I, which explained that individuals whose conduct would subject them to impeachment might also otherwise be subject to criminal prosecution, which, it was contemplated, would be initiated by grand jury indictment.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (“Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not
extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and
enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the
Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial,
Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.”); Adam H. Kurland, First
Principles of American Federalism and the Nature of Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 45 EMORY L.J. 1, 50 (1996) (“[T]he constitutional reference to ‘indictment’ seemed to refer to a uniform federal criminal practice and thus necessarily would presuppose the requirement of indictment by grand jury as part
of the federal criminal process.”).
53. Even prior to the ratification of the Fifth Amendment, however, “federal grand juries returned criminal indictments as a matter of course,” Kurland, supra note 52, at 51 n.179, as evidenced by records of grand jury charges
given by Supreme Court Justices. See id. (citing as one example David J. Katz,
Note, Grand Jury Charges Delivered by Supreme Court Justices Riding Circuit
During the 1790s, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1045, 1085–86 (1993)).
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to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous54 crime, unless
on a presentment55 or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia,56
when in actual service in time of [W]ar or public danger . . . .”57
There is little discussion in the ratification debates regarding the grand jury generally and virtually no discussion of the
relationship of grand jury indictment to jurisdiction.58 The debates surrounding the Grand Jury Clause appear to have been
confined largely to language and style.59

54. An “infamous” crime, for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, includes a
felony (defined under former 18 U.S.C. § 1 (repealed 1984) as any offense punishable by death or a term of imprisonment exceeding one year), a crime punishable by imprisonment in a penitentiary with or without hard labor (with
certain exceptions), and a misdemeanor the punishment for which has the
character of that of the aforementioned. See, e.g., Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S.
417, 429 (1885); 1 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 121, at 518–20 (3d. ed. 1999). For
the sake of simplicity, this Article will refer to infamous crimes for purposes of
the Fifth Amendment’s Grand Jury Clause as felonies.
55. As early as World War II, presentments were no longer used in federal
criminal practice. Upon the 1944 adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the Advisory Committee explained that it had not included a procedural provision for presentments because “presentment has fallen into disuse in the federal courts . . . .” ADVISORY COMM. ON THE RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: SECOND PRELIMINARY
DRAFT 26 (1944); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 178 (1997); Lettow, supra note 46.
56. Armed services personnel are not subject to grand jury indictment and
trial by jury for criminal conduct but rather are subject to court martial. See
Lee v. Madgian, 358 U.S. 228, 232–35, 241 (1959); Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S.
109, 114 (1895); 2 BEALE, supra note 35, § 8:1.
57. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
58. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 51, at 265–78;
SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHT, supra note 44, at 167, 183–84; SHAPIRO, supra
note 42, at 91. Interestingly, James Madison proposed that Article III, Section
Two, which defined the limits of federal court jurisdiction, contain the provision that “presentment or indictment by a grand jury shall be an essential preliminary” to a criminal case. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note
51, at 265; James Madison’s Proposals in the House of Representatives (June
8, 1789), in GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION: A
COMMENTARY app. J-1. at 318 (1995) (including selected sections of James
Madison’s proposals to the House of Representatives on June 8, 1979). Delegate Aedanus Burke of South Carolina was particularly adamant that the
Constitution prohibit prosecutions from being initiated by information. See
THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 51, at 268, 283.
59. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 51, at 268, 283 (providing examples of debates over the use of terms such as “district” and “public
danger”).
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B. EMERGENCE OF THE JURISDICTIONAL NEXUS IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS
It did not take long after the ratification of the Fifth
Amendment for courts to begin recognizing a nexus between
the right to grand jury indictment enumerated in the Grand
Jury Clause and the power of a court to entertain a criminal
case. In the 1808 case of United States v. Hill, Chief Justice
John Marshall, sitting as Circuit Justice, explained:
[N]o act of [C]ongress directs grand juries, or defines their powers. By
what authority, then, are they summoned, and whence do they derive
their powers? The answer is, that the laws of the United States have
erected courts which are vested with criminal jurisdiction. This jurisdiction they are bound to exercise, and it can only be exercised
through the instrumentality of grand juries. They are, therefore, given
by a necessary and indispensable implication. But, how far is this implication necessary and indispensable? The answer is obvious. Its necessity is co-extensive with that jurisdiction to which it is essential.60

Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion, though chiefly focused on
the nature and powers of the grand jury itself, provides an
early example of the jurisdictional significance that courts attributed to the grand jury. The grand jury’s return of an indictment was a prerequisite to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction vested in federal courts by Congress pursuant to Article
III.61 Thus, very early on, there was the recognition of a relationship between the grand jury indictment guarantee and the
jurisdiction of federal courts in criminal cases.
C. THE POST-BELLUM ERA—EX PARTE BAIN AND ITS PROGENY
Federal criminal prosecutions were relatively rare in the
early days of the Republic.62 Moreover, the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to review federal criminal cases was very limited.63 It is unsurprising, therefore, that the Supreme Court
had little to say about the constitutional role of the grand jury
until the post-bellum era,64 by which time federal courts had
60. 26 F. Cas. 315, 317 (Marshall, Circuit Judge, C.C.D. Va. 1809) (emphasis added).
61. See id.
62. See ERWIN C. SURRENCY, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 281
(2002); Kurland, supra note 52, at 57.
63. See infra PartII.E.
64. In addition to the expansion of substantive federal criminal law by the
latter half of the nineteenth century, prior to 1870, informations were rarely
used to prosecute even minor, “non-infamous” offenses in federal courts. Because indictments were used universally, there was not much opportunity for
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begun to clearly indicate their agreement with the view Chief
Justice Marshall had taken of grand jury indictment as a mandatory prerequisite to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction. In
Ex parte Wilson, the Supreme Court considered whether a certain punishment was “infamous” within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment.65 In doing so, the Court acknowledged that a
conclusion in the affirmative meant that “no court of the United
States had jurisdiction to try or punish him, except upon presentment or indictment by a grand jury.”66 Indeed, the Court in
Wilson held that the punishment under consideration was infamous and, therefore, “the District Court, in holding the petitioner to answer for such a crime, and sentencing him to such
imprisonment, without indictment or presentment by a grand
jury, exceeded its jurisdiction . . . .”67
Two years later, in Ex parte Bain, the Court entertained a
petition for writ of habeas corpus brought by a defendant who
had been convicted of a federal false statement offense.68 The
indictment charging the offense had been amended by the trial
court striking certain “surplusage” more than a year after the
indictment had been returned by the grand jury.69 The Court,
after reviewing the common law heritage of the grand jury and
crediting the fundamental individual rights protected by the
institution,70 concluded that an indictment could not be amended by a court after it had been passed upon by the grand jury.71
Therefore, the Court reasoned, an indictment rendered defective or void as a result of a trial court’s amendment deprived
that court of jurisdiction.72
courts to address the issue of federal court jurisdiction in the absence of an indictment. See Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 7 n.3 (1927) (outlining the
history of the use of informations during the first eighty years of the nation).
65. 114 U.S. 417, 429 (1885).
66. Id. at 422.
67. Id. at 429.
68. 121 U.S. 1 (1887), overruled by United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625
(2002).
69. The indictment had alleged that Bain, a bank teller, in filing a false
report, had acted with intent to deceive “the Comptroller of the Currency and
the agent appointed to examine the affairs” of the bank. Id. at 4. The trial
judge, viewing the language “the comptroller of the currency and” as surplusage, struck it from the indictment prior to trial. Id. at 5.
70. Id. at 12–13.
71. Id. at 13–14.
72. See id. at 12–13 (“We are of the opinion that an indictment found by a
grand jury was indispensable to the power of the court to try the petitioner for
the crime with which he was charged.”).
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It is of no avail . . . to say that the court still has jurisdiction of the
person and of the crime; for, though it has possession of the person,
and would have jurisdiction of the crime, if it were properly presented
by indictment, the jurisdiction of the offense is gone, and the court
has no right to proceed any further in the progress of the case for
want of an indictment. If there is nothing before the court which the
prisoner, in the language of the constitution, can be ‘held to answer,’
he is then entitled to be discharged so far as the offense originally
presented to the court by the indictment is concerned. The power of
the court to proceed to try the prisoner is as much arrested as if the
indictment had been dismissed or a nolle prosequi had been entered.
There was nothing before the court on which it could hear evidence or
pronounce sentence.73

Following the logic of Ex parte Bain, later Supreme Court
and lower court rulings reasoned that because an ineffective
indictment deprived a court of jurisdiction over a criminal matter, it is a proper indictment that conveys to a federal court jurisdiction over a criminal matter.74
Although the inquiry addressed in these cases most often
centered on whether fatally defective indictments deprived a
court of jurisdiction, in Ex parte McClusky, a United States
Circuit Judge considered squarely the question whether a defendant in a federal court may waive indictment and be prosecuted for an infamous crime by information.75 Citing Bain, the
court held as follows:
A party cannot waive a constitutional right when its effect is to give a
court jurisdiction. The fifth amendment to the constitution, that no
person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous
crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, provides
for a requisite to jurisdiction. If the crime is of such a nature that an
indictment to warrant a prosecution of the crime is required by the
law, the court has no jurisdiction to try without such indictment.76

Again, grand jury indictment was seen as a mandatory prerequisite to a court’s exercise of jurisdiction.

73. Id. at 13–14.
74. See, e.g., In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 221 (1888); Parkinson v. United
States, 121 U.S. 281, 281–82 (1887); Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348,
354 (1886); Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 429 (1885); Ex parte McClusky, 40
F. 71 (C.C.D. Ark. 1889); cf. United States v. McKee, 26 F. Cas. 1112, 1114
(C.C.E.D. Mo. 1876) (explaining that presentment of an indictment before the
court is the “best evidence of its existence and contents”).
75. 40 F. at 74.
76. Id. (citing Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1; Parkinson, 121 U.S. 281).
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D. THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY
The well-established rule that a valid grand jury indictment was a mandatory prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction in a federal criminal case went unchallenged as the nineteenth century gave way to the twentieth.77 In the 1909 case of
Renigar v. United States, the Fourth Circuit was faced with a
criminal case that had proceeded on an improperly filed indictment.78 In explaining that the filing error meant that “no
indictment was found or presented by a grand jury, which is a
jurisdictional prerequisite,”79 the court cited with approval the
following passage from a leading treatise on the indictment:
[It] was manifestly designed and intended for the security of personal
rights. It is an essential to the jurisdiction of the court[,] and[,] being
a constitutional right of a party, cannot be waived by him so as to
preclude him from subsequently setting up want of jurisdiction in the
court to try him. A party cannot waive a constitutional right when its
effect is to give the court jurisdiction.80

Relying on Bain’s pronouncement that “an indictment
found by a grand jury was indispensable to the power of the
court to try the petitioner for the crime with which he was
charged,”81 the court in Renigar concluded that even the arguably ministerial indictment filing error in that case deprived the
court of jurisdiction:
This is not a question of irregularity, but of substantive law, based
upon the direct terms of the constitutional guaranty that no man
shall be ‘held to answer’ for an infamous offense except on an indict77. See, e.g., Rider v. United States, 149 F. 164, 170 (8th Cir. 1906); Peterson v. Keiffer, 50 F.2d 459, 460 (D.N.J. 1931); United States v. Tyler, 15
F.2d 207, 207 (D. Del. 1926); Ex parte Rumsey, 291 F. 671, 672 (D. Kan. 1923);
cf. Moreland v. United States, 276 F. 640, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1921) (reversing a
conviction in the juvenile court where the sentence was over six months and
the grand jury had not indicted the defendant).
78. 172 F. 646, 647–48 (4th Cir. 1909).
79. Id. at 655 (emphasis added). Interestingly, the next sentence of this
passage from the decision was: “If a valid indictment can be dispensed with, so
may that providing for a trial by a petit jury . . . .” Id.
80. Id. at 656 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting HOWARD
C. JOYCE, TREATISE ON THE LAW GOVERNING INDICTMENTS WITH FORMS § 31
(1908) (citation omitted)). The passage continues:
‘So[,] where there has been no presentment of [the] grand jury[,] or
bill of indictment, the fact that a person confesse[d] in court to being
guilty of a crime[,] which requires an indictment or presentment, confers no power upon the court to sentence him to imprisonment, and he
can only be lawfully sentenced after he has been proceeded against in
the manner provided in the Constitution.’
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting JOYCE, supra, § 32).
81. Renigar, 172 F. at 657 (citing Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. at 12–13).
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ment of a grand jury. The indictment—and that means of course a
valid indictment found and presented according to the settled usage
and established mode of procedure—is a prerequisite to the jurisdiction of the court to try the person accused, an indispensable condition
and requirement, the absence of which renders the proceedings not
simply voidable, but absolutely void.82

Further evidence of the relationship between grand jury
indictment and jurisdiction can be found in a notable state
case, People ex rel. Battista v. Christian, in which the New York
Court of Appeals took up the question of whether an indictment
can be waived by a defendant without divesting the court of jurisdiction.83 Although the United States Supreme Court had
made clear in 1884 that the Grand Jury Clause is not incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the
States,84 the New York State Constitution in the 1920s had a
grand jury provision virtually identical to that of the Fifth
Amendment.85 Despite this constitutional provision, the New
York State Legislature passed a statute providing for waiver of
grand jury indictment.86 The law was soon challenged.87 The
opinion of the New York court, which was joined by Chief Judge
Benjamin N. Cardozo, was explicit in its consideration of the
grand jury right as the root of jurisdiction in capital or felony
cases.88 Declaring that “[c]onsent cannot give a court jurisdiction,” the New York court followed the reasoning of Bain and
McClusky in striking down the waiver provision as unconstitutional.89
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. 249 N.Y. 314 (1928).
84. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1883).
85. Article I, Section 6 of the Constitution of the State of New York provided that “[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime . . . unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury. . . .” CAHILL’S CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK 7 (James C. Cahill ed., 1923).
86. See N.Y. CODE CRIM PROC. § 222 (Bender 1928).
87. See Battista, 249 N.Y. at 317.
88. See id. at 319 (“Until the grand jury shall act, no court can acquire jurisdiction to try. In the most solemn and absolute language the Constitution
dictates the only method by which one can be held to answer for murder, burglary, arson or any other infamous crime. Without the prescribed action by a
grand jury, all our other tribunals are powerless to proceed. Such action is the
foundation of jurisdiction.”).
89. Id. at 320. As the Battista court explained, “waiver is not permitted
where a question of jurisdiction or fundamental rights is involved and public
injury would result.” Id. The court distinguished a “privilege, merely personal,
[which] may be waived” from a “public fundamental right, the exercise of
which is requisite to jurisdiction to try, condemn and punish, [which] is binding upon the individual and cannot be disregarded by him.” Id.
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Given the similarity of the Federal Constitution’s Grand
Jury Clause and the New York state constitutional provision
guaranteeing grand jury indictment, as well as the high regard
in which the New York Court of Appeals was held, the Battista
decision would join Bain, McClusky, and Renigar as the core
support for the proposition that a valid indictment of a grand
jury was a prerequisite to a court’s exercise of jurisdiction over
a criminal matter.90 Treatises of the era accepted this proposition as an accurate statement of constitutional principle.91 Indeed, the view that a valid grand jury indictment was a prerequisite to the federal court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a
criminal matter held sway up through World War II.92 Thus
from the beginning of the nineteenth century through the first
half of the twentieth century, the established and accepted
view of the Grand Jury Clause was that federal criminal jurisdiction depended on the return of a valid grand jury indictment.

90. Waiver of indictment is now permitted in New York. The New York
Constitution was amended in 1973 to permit waiver of indictment in noncapital cases with the consent of the district attorney. See N.Y. CONST. art. I,
§ 6 (McKinney 1974). It should be noted that New York’s Battista case, because it addressed a statutory provision for waiver of indictment rather than a
fatally defective indictment, would serve as a harbinger for how the question
would be presented in the federal system in the 1940s as a result of the rule
providing for waiver of indictment.
91. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. CLARK, JR., HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
7 (1918) (“If the court has no jurisdiction by law to take cognizance of an offense, jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon it by the defendant’s consent.
Consent of the parties cannot supply want of jurisdiction.”); ARMISTEAD M.
DOBIE, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE 65 (1928)
(“[The Fifth Amendment] makes a presentment or an indictment by a grand
jury an essential prerequisite in capital or infamous crimes. And so important
is this right deemed that the accused cannot, even by express consent, waive
the presentment or indictment.” (citing Ex parte McClusky, 40 F. 71, 74
(C.C.D. Ark. 1889); Ex parte Bain 121 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1887), overruled by
United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002)).
92. See, e.g., Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 26–27 (1943)
(noting that the lack of a grand jury indictment affected the jurisdiction of the
court); United States v. Norris, 281 U.S. 619, 622–23 (1930) (observing that an
amendment to grand jury indictment “would oust jurisdiction of the court”);
Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 8 (1927) (“A person may not be punished
for a crime without a formal and sufficient accusation even if he voluntarily
submits to the jurisdiction of the court.” (citing Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1)); see
also S. REP. NO. 72-201, at 2 (1932) (“For many years it was generally held
that an indictment by a grand jury was jurisdictional; that it was indispensable to the power of a court to try a person accused of a felony, and, accordingly
could not be waived.”).
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There is clear evidence, therefore, that well into the twentieth century, a federal district court did not have the power to
proceed in a criminal matter unless and until a valid grand
jury indictment was returned against a defendant. Neither forfeiture nor voluntary waiver of the grand jury right was sufficient to supply a court with jurisdiction to try or sentence a defendant.
E. WHY JURISDICTION MEANT JURISDICTION
Despite this historical evidence, the modern understanding, as expressed by the Cotton Court, is that in the unbroken
line of authority discussed above, the Supreme Court and other
federal and state courts neither understood nor meant what
they wrote about the concept of jurisdiction. The reformers argued, and the Supreme Court ultimately agreed in Cotton, that
those courts which wrote clearly and powerfully that federal
criminal jurisdiction depended on the existence of a valid grand
jury indictment really did not mean to say that a court had no
power to consider a federal criminal case simply because there
was no indictment conferring jurisdiction. This view posits that
the nineteenth century courts were simply terming as “jurisdictional” certain constitutional errors because the Supreme Court
lacked authority to reverse a federal criminal conviction for
non-jurisdictional errors. This reinterpretation is remarkable
in light of the plain language of the earlier decisions and the
unmistakable connection courts repeatedly found between a
valid indictment and jurisdiction.
In Cotton, the Court asserted that “Bain’s elastic concept of
jurisdiction is not what the term ‘jurisdiction’ means today, i.e.,
‘the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the
case.”93 This assertion flies in the in the face of the clear language used in Bain and other cases. There is, in fact, no evidence that Bain and other decisions treating grand jury indictment as a prerequisite to “jurisdiction” were referring to
anything but the “power” to adjudicate the case.94
93. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 630 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t,
523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998)).
94. See, e.g., Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. at 12–13; Renigar v. United States,
172 F. 646, 656 (4th Cir. 1909) (“‘So[,] where there has been no presentment of
[the] grand jury[,] or bill of indictment, the fact that a person confesse[d] in
court to being guilty of a crime[,] which requires an indictment or presentment, confers no power upon the court to sentence him to imprisonment . . . .’”
(quoting JOYCE supra note 80, § 32)); People ex rel. Battista v. Christian, 249
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A fair review of the case law from the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries makes clear that the courts which recognized that a grand jury indictment was a prerequisite to the
exercise of jurisdiction did indeed refer to judicial power.95 In
fact, Bain itself instructed that “an indictment found by a
grand jury was indispensable to the power of the court to try
the petitioner for the crime with which he was charged.”96
Furthermore, trial and appellate courts in the second half
of the twentieth century and even in the months prior to Cotton
still spoke of a relationship between grand jury indictment and
jurisdiction. Surely these contemporary courts understand
“what the term ‘jurisdiction’ means today.”97 Yet these courts,
which presumably comprehend the modern concept of jurisdiction, relied heavily upon Bain and its progeny in concluding
that the absence of an indictment impairs a court’s jurisdiction.
Contrary to the view expressed by the Cotton Court and by
other skeptics, the nineteenth century courts did, indeed, intend that the absence of a grand jury indictment deprive a
court of the power and the authority to entertain a criminal
matter.
Also suspect is the Cotton Court’s reasoning that Bain was
the product of an era when, because there was no right to direct
appeal of criminal convictions to the Supreme Court,98 the
Court would shoehorn obvious constitutional violations into
“jurisdictional defects”—the only type of error cognizable on
habeas review.99 The Court’s description of Bain as a desire for
just outcomes which produced a “‘somewhat expansive notion of

N.Y. 314, 319 (1928) (“Without the prescribed action by a grand jury, all our
other tribunals are powerless to proceed. Such action is the foundation of jurisdiction.”).
95. See supra Part II.A–D and cases cited therein.
96. Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. at 12–13 (emphasis added).
97. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 630.
98. See AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 47, at 84–101; WILLIAM F.
DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 229 (1980). Congress
extended direct review in the Supreme Court to capital cases in 1889 and to
all cases involving infamous crimes in 1891. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517,
26 Stat. 827; Cotton, 535 U.S. at 629–30, 630 n.1; In re Claasen, 140 U.S. 200,
200 (1891). Lower court appellate supervision in criminal cases was established in 1879. See SURRENCY, supra note 62, at 271 (citing Act of Mar. 3,
1879, ch. 176, 20 Stat. 354).
99. See Cotton, 535 U.S. at 629–30; Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. 193, 201–03
(1830).
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“jurisdiction,”’”100 that was “‘more a fiction than anything
else’”101 is as strong a charge of judicial “activism” and expansion of judicial power as is made by the Court’s most vocal critics.
The dismissal of the grand jury’s jurisdictional heritage described above labors not only against history, but against logic.
If the Bain Court or any other court had deemed the right to
grand jury not so fundamental to render denial of that right a
jurisdictional defect, it would have been easy to say as much.
Assuming that, as a general matter, the lack of availability of
federal habeas review in the earlier era contributed to a
broader understanding of “jurisdiction” for the purposes of
avoiding unjust results,102—i.e., unremedied constitutional errors in federal criminal cases—there is no reason to believe
that the courts of the era felt that every constitutional error had
to be remedied. If grand jury indictment were a mere technicality, courts could have just said so and focused on other more
fundamental defects in criminal proceedings.
Indeed, the Court did treat some grand jury-related errors
as mere technicalities. Rather than promiscuously providing relief to habeas petitioners presenting grand jury-related errors,
courts were not reluctant to deny a remedy to petitioners who
presented errors that did not go to the real or constructive absence of a grand jury indictment.103 The Court regularly denied
relief to petitioners who had been convicted on technically defective indictments,104 but found jurisdictional error only where
there was no indictment at all, or where there was, in effect, no
100. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 630 (quoting Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485,
494 (1994)).
101. Id. (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 79 (1977) (citations
omitted)).
102. See Custis, 511 U.S. at 494; Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 79; DUKER, supra
note 98, at 229–30; Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 470 (1963); see also
Nancy J. King, Priceless Process: Non-Negotiable Features of Criminal Litigation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 113, 143–44 (1999). But see James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas/Direct Review Parity,
92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997 (1992) (describing the history of habeas corpus review
and scholarly opinions on the topic).
103. See, e.g., Breese v. United States, 226 U.S. 1, 2 (1912) (denying relief
where an indictment was not presented by the grand jury as a body); Kaizo v.
Henry, 211 U.S. 146, 149 (1908) (holding that an improperly constituted grand
jury did not destroy jurisdiction); cf. Ex parte Ward, 173 U.S. 452, 456 (1899)
(denying relief on habeas review when an unconfirmed judge presided over the
trial).
104. DUKER, supra note 98, at 237–38.
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indictment because it had been voided due to tampering or
flawed grand jury review.105 Additionally, during the era when
writs of error were not cognizable in the Supreme Court, the
Court displayed recognition of that limitation on its appellate
jurisdiction in the context of non-jurisdictional grand juryrelated errors—errors not severe enough to render an indictment null.106
Another factor supports the view that, no matter what inferences one is tempted to draw from the Court’s limited ability
to correct non-jurisdictional errors in criminal cases,107 nineteenth century courts were not stretching the notion of jurisdiction in the context of grand jury indictment. The “jurisdictional” characterization often was employed outside of the
habeas context. Under the Cotton Court’s rationale, there
would have been no further reason to classify an indictment error as jurisdictional for purposes of avoiding injustice after the
advent of federal habeas relief for non-jurisdictional errors.108
However, well after the beginning of the twentieth century,
when habeas review began to expand to non-jurisdictional errors, courts continued to characterize certain deprivations of
the grand jury right as affecting the jurisdiction of the court.109
105. See, e.g., Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 13 (1887), overruled by Cotton, 535
U.S. 625; Renigar v. United States, 172 F. 646, 655 (4th Cir. 1909); Ex parte
McClusky, 40 F. 71, 76 (C.C.D. Ark. 1889).
106. See, e.g., In re Wilson, 140 U.S. 575, 584 (1891).
107. See generally Stephen A. Saltzburg, Habeas Corpus: The Supreme
Court and the Congress, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 367 (1983) (arguing that the Court
has interpreted its habeas jurisdiction without sufficient deference to Congress); Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575 (1993)
(critiquing “institutional competence” and “full review” models of nineteenth
century habeas review and advancing the view that habeas jurisprudence,
properly understood, has not been static).
108. Federal habeas review began to expand beyond jurisdictional errors as
early as the late nineteenth century. E.g. Custis v. United States, 511 U.S.
485, 494 (1994), By the early 1940s, the Supreme Court had “openly discarded” the notion that jurisdiction was the only basis for federal habeas review, which the Court recognized could be applied to lower courts’ “‘disregard
of the constitutional rights of the accused.’” Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,
79 (1977) (quoting Waley v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 101, 104–05 (1942) (per curiam)). In addition, as discussed above, direct review in the Supreme Court of
cases involving capital and infamous crimes was established in the late nineteenth century. See Act of Mar. 3, 1879, ch. 176, 20 Stat. 354. Notably, even
after direct review of criminal cases was authorized, appellate courts continued to term certain grand jury-related errors as “jurisdictional.” See, e.g.,
Renigar, 172 F. at 655.
109. See, e.g., Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 26–27 (1943);
United States v. Norris, 281 U.S. 619, 622–23 (1930); United States v. Mack-
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Thus, even expanded habeas review did not alter the established notion that a valid grand jury indictment was a prerequisite to federal criminal jurisdiction in felony cases.
There is, in short, no reason to believe that the Court said
other than what it believed about the relationship of grand jury
indictment and the court’s power to hear a case. An examination of the historical evidence demonstrates that attempts to
minimize the jurisdictional heritage of the grand jury are
flawed. The nineteenth and early twentieth century courts
treated grand jury indictment as a mandatory jurisdictional
prerequisite, and clearly saw it as a limit on the courts’ power
to entertain a criminal matter. Furthermore, motive does not
explain why the courts of that era found jurisdictional error
outside of the habeas context, and sometimes declined to find
jurisdictional error within it. The grand jury, indeed, boasts a
rich jurisdictional heritage established in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.
III. REALISM, REFORM, AND RULEMAKING:
OBSCURING THE JURISDICTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE
GRAND JURY FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES
Despite the rich jurisdictional heritage of the Grand Jury
Clause, the view subsequently emerged that the right to grand
jury indictment is just another criminal procedural right—
unrelated to a court’s power to hear a case—a right which, in
contrast to subject matter jurisdiction, can be waived or forfeited. Given the historical evidence, how did we get to this
point? The shift in thinking about the relationship between
grand jury indictment and jurisdiction derives not from a constitutional amendment or a novel interpretation by the Supreme Court of the text of the Grand Jury Clause, but from the
legal realist criminal law reform project’s rejection of formalist
and mechanical approaches to criminal procedure in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The reformers’ efforts with respect to the grand jury culminated in the waiver of
indictment provision of Rule 7. Rule 7 provides for waiver of
grand jury indictment in non-capital cases.110 Courts seeking to
lin, 523 F.2d 193, 196 (2d Cir. 1975).
110. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(b). The Rule provides, in relevant part: “(b) Waiving
Indictment. An offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one year
may be prosecuted by information if the defendant—in open court and after
being advised of the nature of the charge and of the defendant’s rights—
waives prosecution by indictment.” Id.
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decouple the right to grand jury indictment from the establishment of a district court’s jurisdiction over a criminal case
have relied upon the fact that Rule 7 permits waiver. As the
syllogism goes, subject matter jurisdiction never can be waived;
Rule 7 permits waiver of grand jury indictment; therefore,
grand jury indictment cannot be a prerequisite to a court’s jurisdiction. The reasoning is perfect provided that each step in
the analysis is constitutionally sound. However, if Rule 7 is not
constitutional, then waiver is not permissible, and the syllogism fails.
Rule 7’s constitutional foundations are questionable at
best. The historical record shows that after many failed legislative attempts, the rulemaking process of the early 1940s created a prime opportunity to address practical considerations
raised by reformers bent upon enhancing the efficiency of disposition of criminal cases in federal courts. The symbiotic ascension of the FRCP and the momentum of the legal realist
criminal reform project ensured an approach more concerned
with the law in action than the law in books.111 The fresh view
led to the gradual discarding of technical, mechanical, and
categorical approaches to the law. Perhaps the promulgation of

111. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY:
SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 93 (1973) (“[T]he realists were driven by the twin motives of intellectual discovery and social improvement. They hoped to understand the legal process in a new and more
useful manner, and they hoped to see both political and legal reform flow from
their discoveries.”). Although the nuances shaping the contours of the philosophy of legal realism are beyond the scope of this Article, it is sufficient for the
limited purposes here to point out that: (1) some of those at the vanguard of
criminal law reform in the early twentieth century are also included on the
lists of legal thinkers who defined or influenced American Legal Realism; and
(2) not only were the aims of the broad criminal law reform project compatible
with those of American Legal Realism, they advanced them. Thus, for example, Roscoe Pound is more accurately described as having belonged to the
American sociological jurisprudence school. See G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early
Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999, 1004 (1972). However, in the
criminal law reform context, American Legal Realism shares enough of the
characteristics of, and is sufficiently derived from, Pound’s philosophy that
this Article, for sake of simplicity, refers to Pound and the core group of likeminded, progressive criminal law reformers in the early twentieth century as
“legal realists.” See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 169–170 (1992); WILFRID
E. RUMBLE, JR., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM: SKEPTICISM, REFORM, AND THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 13 (1968); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Wielding the Double-Edged
Sword: Charles Hamilton Houston and Judicial Activism in the Age of Legal
Realism, 14 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 17, 31 (1998).
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no single provision of the FRCP was impacted more by this reform philosophy than that allowing waiver of indictment in
non-capital felony cases. However, the realists, through the
rulemaking process, disregarded the established understanding
of the jurisdictional heritage of the grand jury and adopted a
pragmatic approach to waiver of indictment that eliminated
grand jury indictment as a jurisdictional prerequisite—all
without having to amend the Constitution.
A. ENVIRONMENT OF REFORM
1. American Legal Realism and Criminal Procedure Reform
Early in the twentieth century, American Legal Realism
shook the consciousness of U.S. legal culture with its call for rejection of nineteenth century formalism and its recognition of
the importance of social realities in the law’s interpretation and
administration. A prominent manifestation of this new approach to the law was found in the philosophy undergirding reform efforts in criminal law. This result is not surprising, given
that a number of prominent legal realists were engaged in the
criminal law reform movement of the early twentieth century.
Roscoe Pound, then-dean of Harvard Law School, directed
a well-received survey of the administration of criminal justice
in Cleveland, Ohio, published in 1922.112 The survey, as codirector Felix Frankfurter wrote in the preface, was conducted
by “men whose professional interest is the scientific administration of justice adapted to modern industrial conditions”113
and had the dual goals of “render[ing] an accounting of the
functioning of this system”114 and “trac[ing] to their controlling
sources whatever defects in the system the inquiry disclosed.”115 The study was hailed in the Harvard Law Review as
having “demonstrated how it is sought to avoid the mechanical
operation of legal rules in our administration of criminal justice.”116
112. See THE CLEVELAND FOUND., CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND (Roscoe Pound & Felix Frankfurter eds., 1922); JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 82 (1995) (describing the
Cleveland study as, “the best of many such surveys”).
113. THE CLEVELAND FOUND., supra note 112, at vii.
114. Id. at v.
115. Id.
116. Note, Judicial Discretion in the Filing of Informations, 36 HARV. L.
REV. 204, 204 (1922).
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In the Cleveland study, Pound advocated reforms that had
broader applicability to other jurisdictions,117 and he elsewhere
was a vocal supporter of criminal law reform that rejected “an
analytical scheme or rigid system worked out logically in libraries on the sole basis of books and law reports.”118 Pound also
subsequently served on President Hoover’s Wickersham Commission, which studied a series of topics related to the administration of criminal justice in the United States. Pound’s major
contribution to the commission’s work—a report on the prosecution function—recommended a number of bold reforms to the
way criminal cases were adjudicated in the nation’s courts.119
Another legal realist, Charles E. Clark, professor and dean
of Yale Law School in the 1920s and 1930s and a strong proponent of the use of empirical social science in law,120 engaged in
a study of court administration in Connecticut, modeled after
the Cleveland study.121 Clark, who had long been a student of
reform of criminal and civil procedure and evidence,122 also subsequently served as a consultant to the Wickersham Commission, studying federal district courts,123 and later served as reporter for the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.124
One of the central tenets of the early twentieth century
criminal reform movement was that adjudicatory criminal procedure was in need of overhaul.125 These reformers, a broad and

117. THE CLEVELAND FOUND., supra note 112, at 649–52.
118. Roscoe Pound, The Future of the Criminal Law, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
16 (1921) [hereinafter Pound, The Future].
119. NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON
PROSECUTION 37–38 (1931).
120. See HORWITZ, supra note 111, at 312 n.85.
121. See CHARLES E. CLARK & HARRY SHULMAN, A STUDY OF LAW ADMINISTRATION IN CONNECTICUT (1937).
122. See SCHLEGEL, supra note 112, at 83.
123. See 1 AM. LAW INST., A STUDY OF THE BUSINESS OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS (1934).
124. Interestingly, Clark’s work in Connecticut and on the federal courts
with the Wickersham Commission was not as well-received as the Pound
study. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 111, at 312 n.85; SCHLEGEL, supra note
112, at 85–98.
125. See, e.g., SCHLEGEL, supra note 112, at 83 (discussing the view that
“procedure was too technical and complicated and, as a result, allowed lawyers
imbued with ‘the sporting theory of justice’ to avoid decisions on the merits of
claims by playing procedural games”); Rollin M. Perkins, Absurdities in
Criminal Procedure, 11 IOWA L. REV. 297, 318–19 (1926) (discussing reform
efforts of the early twentieth century).
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diverse collection of academic and legal reform groups,126
thought that procedural rules laden with the rigidity and formalism of the previous two centuries were doing a disservice to
the administration of criminal justice in the United States.127
In 1906, Pound addressed the American Bar Association, critiquing the role of procedure in perverting adjudication into
something more akin to a contest.128
As Pound later wrote in 1921:
The legal science of to-day, with its functional attitude, its study of
law in action as well as law in books, its insistence upon justice
through rules in contrast to abstractly just rules, and its insistence
upon the limitations on effective legal action and the importance of
discovering means of making legal rules achieve their purpose, could
be made to do great things in the domain of criminal law.129

Others would answer Pound’s call for a new approach to
adjudicatory criminal procedure less concerned with the mechanical approaches of the nineteenth century and more adaptive to social conditions as they existed in the early twentieth
century.130

126. See, e.g., SCHLEGEL, supra note 112, at 83–84 (noting antecedents of
the movement for procedural reform in the 1920s and 1930s).
127. For instance, one commentator in 1911 lamented the “evils” criminal
procedure visits upon the criminal justice system, and called for “sorely”
needed reform. John Davison Lawson, Technicalities in Procedure, Civil and
Criminal, 1 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 63, 75, 85 (1911). An observer in 1925 argued that judges in criminal cases were “applying antiquated
rules of procedure, which have no life or vitality to cope with present social requirements.” Lenn J. Oare, Our Antiquated Criminal Procedure, 1 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 35, 35 (1925).
128. See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice, 29 AM. L. REV. 729, 731 (1906) (“The most important and most constant cause of dissatisfaction with all law at all times is to
be found in the necessarily mechanical operation of legal rules.”).
129. Pound, The Future, supra note 118, at 15.
130. See, e.g., Herbert S. Hadley, Present Conditions Historically Considered, 11 A.B.A. J. 674, 679 (1925) (calling for “changes in our system of procedure as will tend to make our administration of justice prompt, efficient and
final, and free it from its present burden of technicality and formalism that a
dead past has imposed upon it”); Perkins, supra note 125, at 334 (“[N]ow it is
high time the old cumbersome out-of-date methods of administering criminal
justice were giving way to new, more in keeping with the needs of the twentieth century.”). See generally Wayne L. Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10 OR. L. REV. 101 (1931) (discussing the results of a social science study
of the American grand jury system).
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2. Grand Jury Reform and Abolition
At the same time as the early twentieth century rise to
prominence of the legal realist approaches to reform of adjudicatory criminal procedure, the grand jury was coming under increasing attack in the United States. The reformers in the
United States, however, were not original in their attacks on
the grand jury; they were merely following the lead of the English.131 From Jeremy Bentham’s early nineteenth century critiques of the grand jury,132 respect for the grand jury in England continued to diminish throughout the nineteenth century
and into the twentieth century,133 as detractors cited the perceived corruption, inefficiency, and expense of the grand jury
system. During World War I, the use of grand juries in England
was suspended.134 Although English grand juries were reinstated in 1921, a groundswell of support for their permanent
abolition had formed in the war years, and, during the 1920s,
the anti-grand jury movement in England gained significant
momentum. Ultimately, in the wake of criticism of the grand
jury levied by prominent jurists and the perceived financial
drain of the grand jury in Depression-era England, the House
of Commons formed a commission to study the proposed abandonment of the grand jury system.135 The commission recommended elimination of the grand jury, and, in September of
1933, Parliament abolished the grand jury.136
Anti-grand jury advocates in the United States certainly
had been taking note. Although almost all of the original states
provided for grand jury indictment in their constitutions, a
131. See generally Edson R. Sunderland, The English Struggle for Procedural Reform, 39 HARV. L. REV. 725 (1926) (reviewing the history of English
procedural reform).
132. See JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (1827); see
also SHAPIRO, supra note 42, at 98–101; Richard D. Younger, The Grand Jury
Under Attack, 46 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 26, 28 (1955) [hereinafter Younger, The Grand Jury] (citing 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM
139–40, 171 (John Bowring ed., 1843); JEREMY BENTHAM, THE ELEMENTS OF
THE ART OF PACKING, AS APPLIED TO SPECIAL JURIES 14–28 (1821)).
133. See Younger, The Grand Jury, supra note 132, at 28–29, 32–35; Royal
Commission on Delay in the King’s Bench Division, Second and Final Report
of the Commissioners, Nov. 28, 1913 (recommending the abolition of the grand
jury in England).
134. See Younger, The Grand Jury, supra note 132, at 217.
135. See id.
136. See Albert Lieck, Abolition of the Grand Jury in England, 25 J. AM.
INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 623, 623 (1934); Younger, The Grand Jury, supra note 132, at 217.
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movement away from indictment as a means of instituting
state felony prosecutions continued throughout the nineteenth
century.137 In 1884, the Supreme Court, in Hurtado, affirmed
California’s use of the preliminary examination in lieu of grand
jury indictment,138 a decision which led to further anti-grand
jury sentiment at the state level in the late nineteenth century.139 The sharp criticism of the grand jury continued into the
twentieth century, and just as England was disposing of the
ancient institution during the interwar period, the movement
to abolish the grand jury gained traction in the United
States.140
This anti-grand jury sentiment was prevalent among those
engaged in broader criminal law reform as part of the legal realist project. The law reviews and bar journals of the 1920s and
1930s are replete with calls for the reform or abolition of the
grand jury.141 The Cleveland study deemed the grand jury redundant in a system that also had provision for preliminary
examination, and claimed that “[i]t is no longer needed as a
bulwark of our liberties”142 and “does little more than rubberstamp the opinion of the prosecutor.”143

137. See, e.g., Younger, The Grand Jury, supra note 132, at 29–49.
138. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884).
139. See, e.g., Eugene Stevenson, Our Grand Jury System, 8 CRIM. L. MAG.
& REP. 711, 715, 717 (1886) (calling for an anti-grand jury constitutional
amendment in New Jersey and arguing that “the grand jury system would
never be seriously suggested in our day if it did not already exist . . . .”);
Younger, The Grand Jury, supra note 132, at 42–45.
140. See, e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 38, at 35–44 (acknowledging contemporary criticism of grand juries); R. Justin Miller, Informations or Indictment
in Felony Cases, 8 MINN. L. REV. 379, 407–08 (1923) (supporting Minnesota’s
proposed move to information as a method of instituting all prosecutions). See
generally George H. Dession & Isadore H. Cohen, The Inquisitorial Functions
of Grand Juries, 41 YALE L.J. 687 (1931) (offering criticisms of grand juries
and reviewing the claims of critics).
141. See, e.g., Charles Kellogg Burdick, Possibility of Improvement by
Statutory Changes and Constitutional Amendments Affecting Procedure, 11
A.B.A. J. 510, 511–15 (1925) (questioning the utility of grand juries); Raymond
Moley, The Initiation of Criminal Prosecutions by Indictment or Information,
29 MICH. L. REV. 403, 425, 430–31 (1931) (presenting the results of a study
comparing the two methods of initiating prosecutions). But see Jerome Hall,
Analysis of Criticism of the Grand Jury, 22 AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
692 (1931) (calling attention to possible problems with the critiques of grand
juries).
142. THE CLEVELAND FOUND., supra note 112, at 211.
143. Id. at 212. Pound specifically called for the abolition of the grand jury
in Cleveland. Id. at 650.

FAIRFAX_4FMT

430

12/22/2006 11:01:15 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[91:398

These designs for reforming or abolishing the grand jury
were not limited to state grand juries.144 Although Pound’s arguments were largely centered on the Cleveland grand jury, the
Cleveland study bemoaned the “accumulation of detail and
drain upon facilities, human and otherwise” effected by having
both a grand jury and a preliminary examination at the federal
level.145 Furthermore, the study echoed arguments made by
Pound and others elsewhere regarding the grand jury institution in general, including federal grand juries.146
The Hurtado opinion had freed states to abolish the grand
jury, but whatever the reformers’ thoughts about the usefulness of the grand jury on the federal level, the Grand Jury
Clause stood as an absolute bar to the abolition of the federal
grand jury. Despite this constitutional obstacle to complete abolition of the grand jury, however, a provision allowing felony
defendants to waive the right to grand jury indictment, was,
many reformers thought, an achievable goal.
B. CAMPAIGN FOR WAIVABILITY OF FEDERAL GRAND JURY
INDICTMENT
As part of the larger movement to reform judicial procedure in the criminal area, bar and law reform associations,
judges, legal scholars, and politicians—including members of
Congress and the Hoover and Roosevelt administrations—
engaged in a campaign to establish the availability of waiver in
the grand jury context. Although discussion of indictment

144. There had long been grumblings about the efficacy and usefulness of
the federal grand jury. Congress, in 1846, placed the summoning of federal
grand juries within the discretion of the presiding judge. See Younger, The
Grand Jury, supra note 132, at 31. In 1892, a Justice of the U.S. Supreme
Court proposed the elimination of the grand jury to simplify criminal procedure. See id. at 44, 47 (citing Justice (Henry B.) Brown, Assoc. Justice Supreme Court of the U.S., Address at Ohio Bar Association Annual Session
(July 14, 1892), in 13 OHIO STATE BAR ASSOCIATION REPORTS 35, 42–43
(1892)).
145. THE CLEVELAND FOUND., supra note 112, at 190.
146. See RAYMOND MOLEY, POLITICS AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 127–28
(1929). The 1931 Wickersham Commission report concluded that “under modern conditions the grand jury is seldom better than a rubber stamp of the
prosecuting attorney and has ceased to perform or be needed for the function
for which it was established and for which it was retained throughout the centuries.” NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, supra note
119, at 124–25. One federal appellate court in 1928 lamented that the grand
jury had atrophied beyond recognition. Falter v. United States, 23 F.2d 420,
425 (2d Cir. 1928) (noting the “degradation of that ancient institution”).
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waiver can be found in the context of state constitutional law
early in the twentieth century,147 the debate with regard to
waiver of federal grand jury indictment began in earnest in the
early 1930s. The American Law Institute, in its 1930 Draft
Code of Criminal Procedure, included a provision allowing
prosecution for felony offenses without indictment.148
The advocacy surrounding criminal procedure and grand
jury reform would begin to migrate from the law reform and legal academia circles and enter the political sphere in the early
1930s.
1. United States v. Gill
Efforts to provide for waiver of indictment in federal criminal cases were aided immensely by a 1931 federal district court
opinion, United States v. Gill.149 In Gill, the court was presented squarely with the question whether a defendant may
waive indictment and “consent to be charged by information for
an offense above the grade of misdemeanor.”150 The court in
Gill reviewed the grand jury indictment’s historical position in
the context of the common law and catalogued other waivable
criminal procedural rights, including those related to selfincrimination, speedy trial, confrontation of witnesses, double
jeopardy, unreasonable searches and seizures, and assistance
of counsel.151
While acknowledging Ex parte Bain’s teaching that an indictment is a prerequisite to a federal court’s jurisdiction over a
criminal matter, the court pointed out that the right to trial by
jury, which—up until the Supreme Court’s Patton v. United
147. See Note, The Constitutionality of a Statute Dispensing with Indictment on Plea of Guilty, 29 HARV. L. REV. 326 (1916).
148. See AM. LAW INST., CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 113, 115 (1930)
(permitting the government to choose to initiate prosecution by either information or indictment; requiring indictment only in felony or capital cases
where the defendant neither had nor waived preliminary examination).
149. United States v. Gill, 55 F.2d 399 (D.N.M. 1931). Judge Orie Phillips
was elevated to the Tenth Circuit by President Hoover in 1929. Phillips, who
later was considered for an appointment to the Supreme Court, was involved
in the deliberations over the adoption of the waiver provision in the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. In 1950, he was awarded the prestigious American Bar Association Medal for his work in legal reform. See 75 REP. AM. BAR
ASS’N 151, 152 (1950) (accepting award as recognition of “the work of judges
and lawyers unselfishly striving together to make the law so living and dynamic as to meet the needs of a modern and complex society”).
150. Gill, 55 F.2d at 399.
151. Id. at 400.
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States152 decision one year prior—also had been considered jurisdictional and non-waivable. However, as the court in Gill
pointed out, the Patton Court explained that the common law’s
aversion to waiver of the right to jury trial and other criminal
procedural protections “‘was unquestionably founded upon the
anxiety of the courts to see that no innocent man should be
convicted’” in an age when penalties were disproportionately
severe, counsel was not afforded to defendants, and waiver
principles were applied harshly and without regard to the sophistication of unrepresented defendants.153
Adopting the reasoning of Patton, which held that the right
to trial by jury is waivable,154 the court in Gill declared that
“the provision of the Fifth Amendment requiring an indictment
in capital or other infamous cases creates a personal privilege
which the defendant may waive.”155
Thus, the Gill decision analogized the right to grand jury
indictment to the right to jury trial, which had been declared by
the court in 1930 to be waivable. This analogy, however, is
flawed. Whether a defendant might forgo a jury trial and agree
to a bench trial or even forgo trial altogether and plead guilty
has no bearing on whether jurisdiction had been established
over the criminal case in the first instance. If compliance with
the Grand Jury Clause is a jurisdictional prerequisite, it is essential no matter how the defendant is permitted to proceed to
guilt adjudication under the Article III and Sixth Amendment
clauses of the Constitution relating to the petit jury. This juris-

152. 281 U.S. 276 (1930), abrogated by Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78
(1970); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s
Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 69–70 (2003)
(noting the changes brought about by the Patton decision).
153. Gill, 55 F.2d at 402 (quoting Patton, 281 U.S. at 307 (citations omitted)).
154. Id. at 403 (concluding that “the reasoning of the court in the Patton
Case should apply with equal force” to the question of waivability of grand
jury indictment).
155. Id. But see Ex parte McClusky, 40 F. 71, 74 (C.C.D. Ark. 1889) (“A
party cannot waive a constitutional right when its effect is to give a court jurisdiction.” (citation omitted)); id. (“The fifth amendment to the constitution,
that no person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous
crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, provides for a
requisite to jurisdiction.” (citing Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887), overruled by
United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002); Parkinson v. United States, 121
U.S. 281 (1887))).
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dictional requirement is precisely how the federal courts
viewed grand jury indictment for nearly a century and a half.156
Even though the Gill court was willing to break with
precedent and analogize the indictment provision to the jury
trial right, the court concluded that, without congressional action, an indictment was still a necessary prerequisite to invoking federal criminal jurisdiction.157 Congress had not provided
for any other method of initiating a felony prosecution. The
fundamental holding of the Gill decision was that a grand jury
indictment was a jurisdictional prerequisite in a felony case because Congress had not yet passed a law to the contrary, not
because the Grand Jury Clause made it so.
Despite Gill’s shortcomings, the case would spur on the reform project’s push for waiver of grand jury indictment. Using
the Gill decision’s reasoning as a springboard, both bench and
bar advanced the position that waiver of indictment should be
permitted in federal criminal cases out of the expressed concern
for detained defendants—particularly those held in districts
156. Furthermore, as Professor Akhil Amar has argued, the reasoning of
the Patton Court is suspect in light of, for example, the plain language of those
clauses. See AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 47, at 104–08. Also, aside from
any quarrels one might have with the propriety of the analogy to the waivability of the right to jury trial, at least the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the
prior approach of treating jury trial as necessary to a court’s jurisdiction. At
the time of Gill, the Supreme Court had not—and, indeed, still has not—
advanced any rationale for straying from the 150 years of treating the right to
grand jury indictment as a mandatory, non-waivable jurisdictional prerequisite.
157. Gill, 55 F.2d at 404 (“[W]hile the provision of the Fifth Amendment
requiring an indictment where the offense is capital or otherwise infamous
creates a personal privilege which may be waived, it will take enabling legislation by Congress to authorize an accusation to be made in such a case by information filed by the United States Attorney.”). The court reasoned that because at common law only misdemeanors could be prosecuted by information,
federal prosecutors could not proceed by information in felony cases, even if a
defendant has waived indictment, in the absence of statutory abrogation of the
common law rule. See id. (“It follows that no lawful accusation has been filed
against the defendant; that the jurisdiction of the court was not properly invoked, and that the sentence was void.”). The court pointed out that although
the language of the amendment did nothing to alter common law understandings, it did “fix[ ] the matter, beyond the power of congress or the courts to alter the course proceeding in bringing forward a charge of crime, in the class of
cases embraced by the provision.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Albrecht v.
United States, 273 U.S. 1, 5–6 & n.1 (1927); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1780 (1833) (“[The] process [of charging by information] is rarely recurred to in America; and it has never yet been formally put
into operation by any positive authority of congress, under the national government, in mere cases of misdemeanor . . . .”).
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where grand juries met infrequently—who may wish to plead
guilty in an attempt to expedite the commencement (and completion) of an expected term of imprisonment.158 Regardless of
whether the expressions of concern for the welfare of criminal
defendants were genuine,159 this “real world” view of how the
rules of criminal procedure should serve the ends of efficiency
and justice would be woven throughout the calls for provision of
waiver.
2. The Hoover Administration and Congress
In 1932, Professor John B. Waite predicted that the Supreme Court would uphold as constitutional a provision for
waiver of indictment should Congress pass such a statute.160
Professor Waite’s prediction, which rested primarily upon comparison of the right to grand jury indictment with the jury trial
right which had recently been held by the Supreme Court to be
waivable,161 was prompted by a recommendation made to Congress by President Herbert Hoover earlier that year.
158. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 7; 6 FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEWITH NOTES AND INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 156–57 (Alexander Holtzoff
ed., 1946); Homer Cummings, The Third Great Adventure, 3 F.R.D. 283, 285
(1944) (“A highly desirable provision of the Rules permits a defendant, except
in a capital case, to waive indictment and to consent to prosecution by information.”); Alexander Holtzoff, Reform of Federal Criminal Procedure, 3 F.R.D.
445, 449–50 (1944) [hereinafter Holtzoff, Reform] (discussing how the provision aids indigent defendants unable to make bail); Alexander Holtzoff, Some
Problems of Federal Criminal Procedure, 2 F.R.D. 431, 436 (1943) [hereinafter
Holtzoff, Some Problems] (describing how defendants in rural and outlying
districts “may languish in jail for a number of months before he can be indicted”).
159. There is a degree of irony in the call for the diminution of the grand
jury to protect criminal defendants. As this Part shows, much of the political
support for the waiver provision derived from a desire to reduce the costs of
administering the criminal justice system, a goal against which the Bill of
Rights might sometimes be found in opposition. Of course, there were ways
other than allowing waiver of grand jury indictment to protect the reformers’
hypothetical defendant from languishing in confinement awaiting the empanelling of a grand jury. For example, pre-trial release could be expanded, additional grand juries could be empanelled, defendants could consent to be transferred to other districts or divisions where grand juries may be sitting, or
grand juries simply could sit more frequently in all districts. Indeed, many
such accommodations are necessitated by the statutory framework developed
pursuant to the Speedy Trial Clause. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–74 (2000).
160. See John B. Waite, President Hoover’s Recommendations—Waiver of
Right to Accusation by Grand Jury Indictment, 30 MICH. L. REV. 922, 928
(1932) (quoting President Asks for Reforms in Judicial System, U.S. DAILY
(Wash., D.C.), Mar. 1, 1932, at 1.
161. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930), abrogated by
DURE:
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President Hoover urged Congress to legislate a provision
for waiver of indictment for purposes that would be cited by
proponents of waiver throughout their campaign:
Legislation should be enacted to permit an accused person to waive
the requirement of indictment by grand jury. Where the accused admits his guilt, preliminary hearings and grand-jury proceedings are
not necessary for his protection, they cause unnecessary expense and
delay. In such cases the law should permit immediate plea and sentence upon the filing of an information. That would allow the accused
to begin immediate service of his sentence without languishing in jail
to await action of a grand jury, and would reduce the expense of
maintenance of prisoners, lessen the work of prosecutors, and tend to
speed up disposition of criminal cases.162

At the time of President Hoover’s remarks, the SeventySecond Congress already was acting upon legislation providing
for waiver of indictment in federal criminal cases.163 Senate Bill
2655, an Act “providing for waiver of prosecution by indictment
in certain criminal proceedings,” allowed for waiver of indictment, in open court and in writing, unless a preliminary examination had previously resulted in the discharge of the defendant.164
Although the bill was easily passed in the Senate, it was
the subject of controversy in the House,165 where the Judiciary
Committee produced a minority report signed by eleven members.166 In contrast to the views of the Senate Judiciary Committee and the House Judiciary Committee majority that the

Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
162. See HERBERT HOOVER, SPECIAL MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS ON REFORM OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE, (1932), reprinted in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: HERBERT HOOVER 83, 86 (1977); Waite,
supra note 160, at 928 (quoting President Asks for Reforms in Judicial System,
supra note 160).
163. See 72 CONG. REC. 75, 5092 (1932).
164. See id.
165. During debate, Representative Thomas D. McKeown, Democrat of
Oklahoma, stressed that the waiver provision did not deprive a defendant of
the right to grand jury involuntarily, but it made guilty pleas more efficient
and would save the treasury between $250,000 to $300,000 per annum. 72
CONG. REC. 76, 698–99 (1932). Representative Burnett M. Chiperfield, Republican of Illinois, expressed a concern with coercion of vulnerable defendants
and argued that the provision “is an iniquitous measure and it should not be
passed in this way.” Id. Representative Fiorello H. La Guardia, Republican of
New York, lauded the grand jury as “one of the outstanding protections to individuals of our whole Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, and it should not be
brushed aside on a plea of saving $250,000, to be spread over a whole nation.”
Id. at 698–99.
166. See H.R. REP. NO. 72-1300, at 8 (1932).
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right to indictment “is personal and may be waived,”167 the minority report of the House Judiciary Committee asserted the
view that grand jury indictment is a mandatory prerequisite to
a district court’s jurisdiction.168 Dismissing the analogy to the
Patton Court’s approval of waiver of the right jury trial, the
minority report argued that the grand jury right “is not merely
a right of the defendant, personal to him, which may be
waived,” but is “a restriction upon the right and jurisdiction of
the court, and it is beyond the power of any defendant to confer
jurisdiction where none would otherwise exist.”169
Notably, the minority report saw in the waiver provision
an attempt by the criminal law reformers to achieve their ultimate goal of abolition of the grand jury:
That this bill is an attempt to weaken the protection accorded the
citizen by the grand jury system can not be denied; and if we begin to
countenance attacks upon that system, it may not be long until other
legislators, sitting in our places, will begin to listen to the arguments
of other legal writers who have been for years insisting that the grand
jury has outgrown its usefulness, and should be abolished in its entirety.170

Although the Senate Committee that had reported favorably on Senate Bill 2655 also acknowledged the historical relationship between grand jury indictment and jurisdiction,171 the
House minority report demonstrated that, even into the 1930s,
there was still a recognition of the jurisdictional heritage of the
grand jury.172
Despite the failure of legislative attempts to provide for
waiver of indictment,173 a steady drumbeat of pro-waiver advocacy emanated from the Department of Justice during the
167. S. REP. NO. 72-201, at 2–3 (1932); see also H.R. REP. NO. 72-1300, at
2–3.
168. H.R. REP. NO. 72-1300, at 5–8.
169. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
170. Id. at 7.
171. S. REP. NO. 72-201, at 2 (“For many years it was generally held that
an indictment by a grand jury was jurisdictional; that it was indispensable to
the power of a court to try a person accused of a felony, and, accordingly could
not be waived.”).
172. H.R. REP. NO. 72-1300, at 5–8. The minority report also asserted that
the waiver of indictment would expose less sophisticated defendants to undue
pressure from the government, and made a textual argument that the language of the Grand Jury Clause is of a mandatory nature. See id. at 6–8.
173. Both S. 2655, 72nd Cong. (1932), and S. 1518, 73rd Cong. (1933), identical bills introduced during the first session of the seventy-second and seventy-third Congresses respectively, failed to become law. Similar legislation
introduced during the Roosevelt administrations also met a similar fate.
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1930s. A review of the annual reports of attorneys general in
that decade evidences repeated calls for legislative action on
the issue of waivability.174 By the late 1930s, Roosevelt Attorney General Homer Cummings, who had earlier highlighted
the issue of “waiver of indictment by grand jury in certain
criminal cases,”175 spurred the Justice Department to draft and
propose legislation on waivability by the Justice Department:
At my request a number of bills drafted in the Department of Justice
were introduced and are now pending before the Congress. Their purpose is to eliminate archaic technicalities and to make possible
greater expedition in the disposition of criminal cases without depriving defendants of any substantial rights to which they should be entitled. Among such measures are the following: To permit the defendant to waive indictment by grand jury and to consent to prosecution
by information.176

The criminal law reformers’ 1930s campaign for waivability waged in the law reviews, law reform and bar groups, lower
courts, the Congress, and the executive branch, though unsuccessful, had gained enough momentum to capitalize on the
golden opportunity presented by the federal criminal procedural judicial rulemaking of the 1940s.
C. THE RULEMAKING PROCESS
Despite the more general procedural reform efforts of the
early twentieth century, by the end of the 1930s federal crimi-

174. For example, in his 1931 annual report, Herbert Hoover’s Attorney
General William D. Mitchell wrote:
Legislation should be enacted permitting an accused to waive the requirement of an indictment by a grand jury. Where the accused intends to plead guilty, preliminary hearings and grand jury proceedings are needless for his protection and cause unnecessary expense
and delay. In such cases the law should permit the filing of an information and immediate plea and sentence. Such a system will tend to
speed up the disposition of criminal cases. The recent decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States respecting waiver by the accused
of the right to trial by petit jury, and the recent recommendation by
the judicial conference respecting this matter, give ground to believe
that there is no valid constitutional objection to this proposal.
1931 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 2–3; see also 1932 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 6 (“I call
special attention to the pending bill to allow waiver of indictments by the accused . . . .”).
175. 1933 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 1.
176. 1937 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 11. Likewise, Cummings’ successor, Frank
Murphy, used his 1940 annual report “to call attention also to the following
pending legislation drafted in this Department: A bill to permit a defendant in
a criminal case to waive indictment by grand jury (H.R. 1994).” 1939 ATT’Y
GEN. ANN. REP. 7.
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nal procedure was still “in a somewhat amorphous and disorganized state.”177 Prior to the promulgation of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the procedure guiding criminal
matters in federal courts was a hodge-podge gleaned from the
common law, federal statutes “sporadically enacted at different
times in regard to isolated points,”178 and the law of the forum
state “to which the Federal courts conform in respect to many
matters which are not governed by Federal statutes.”179 Rules
governing federal civil procedure had been promulgated during
the 1930s with great success.180 Against this backdrop, the frequent advocacy regarding the proposed grand jury waiver provision, and the need for other criminal procedure rules more
generally, prompted Congress to act.181
On June 29, 1940, Congress authorized the Supreme Court
to promulgate rules governing federal criminal procedure, just
as it had in previous years for civil procedure and for appellate
procedure in criminal cases.182 The Court appointed an Advi177. Alexander Holtzoff, Proposed Rules of Criminal Procedure, 3 F.R.D.
420, 420 (1944) [hereinafter Holtzoff, Proposed Rules]; see also Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 749–50 (2001) (noting that, with few exceptions,
federal courts applied state procedural law into the twentieth century).
178. Holtzoff, Proposed Rules, supra note 177, at 420; see also United
States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 376 (1953) (arguing that the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure were meant to promote simplicity in procedure).
179. Holtzoff, Proposed Rules, supra note 177, at 420; see also Holtzoff, Reform, supra note 158, at 447.
180. See Homer Cummings, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
5 F.R.D. 20, 22 (1946).
181. See Proceedings of the Institute on Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 5 F.R.D. 88, 91 (1946). The adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure had been urged by, among others, then-Attorney General Robert
Jackson. In his Annual Report of the Attorney General for the fiscal year ended
1940, Jackson noted that the Supreme Court’s promulgation of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, made possible by the congressional enabling act of
June 19, 1934, made the new civil rules “probably the simplest form of civil
procedure yet devised in any jurisdiction in which Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence
prevails.” 1940 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP 5. Jackson went on to note, however, that
criminal procedure remained “largely in a chaotic and archaic state” with
“[m]any technicalities dating back a century or two. . . .” Id. Praising the recent passage of an enabling act empowering the Supreme Court to promulgate
rules of criminal procedure, Jackson was optimistic that the act would “undoubtedly lead to a reform in criminal procedure that will be as vital as the
recent changes in civil procedure.” Id.
182. See Act of June 29, 1940, ch. 445, 54 Stat. 688; Arthur T. Vanderbilt,
New Rules of Federal Criminal Procedure, 29 A.B.A. J. 376, 376 (1943). For a
discussion of the development and restoration of judicial rulemaking authority
in the 1930s and 1940s, see Alexander Holtzoff, Participation of the Bar in Ju-
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sory Committee to draft the new rules.183 The seventeen member Committee, chaired by Arthur T. Vanderbilt, a former
president of the American Bar Association, was comprised of
prominent practitioners and academics, learned in the criminal
law and drawn from across the United States.184 Some of the
nation’s foremost advocates of criminal law reform served on
the Committee, including George H. Dession of Yale Law
School and Sheldon Glueck of Harvard Law School, both advocates of integrating social considerations into criminal processes.185
At the same time the Court and Advisory Committee were
undertaking to develop the new criminal rules, the advocacy for
waivability continued. In the early 1940s, the Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges recommended that “existing law
or established procedure be so changed that a defendant may
waive indictment and plead guilty to an information filed by a
United States attorney in all cases except capital felonies.”186
The judges stated that the rationale for provision for waiver of
indictment was so that “a defendant, who desires to plead
guilty, [can] avoid the delays which sometimes occur when the
impaneling of a grand jury to find an indictment is required.”187
As many reformers had been arguing, waiver of indictment was
necessary to facilitate pre-indictment guilty pleas.
These pro-waiver sentiments manifested in the preliminary draft of the proposed rules, transmitted to Chief Justice
Harlan F. Stone from the Committee in May of 1942.188 Rule
dicial Rule-Making, 3 F.R.D. 165 (1944) [hereinafter Holtzoff, Participation];
Holtzoff, Reform, supra note 158, at 431.
183. See Appointment of Advisory Committee on Rules in Criminal Cases,
312 U.S. 717 (1941); Holtzoff, Some Problems, supra note 158.
184. Holtzoff, Participation, supra note 182, at 166; Holtzoff, Reform, supra
note 158, at 447 (listing members and affiliations).
185. See ADVISORY COMM. ON THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: SECOND PRELIMINARY DRAFT, at iii–iv
(1944). In addition to the Advisory Committee itself, there were judiciallyappointed bar committees organized in each federal judicial district in the
United States that would critique each draft of the rules along with national,
state, county, and city bar associations and members of the federal bench. See
Holtzoff, Participation, supra note 182, at 167.
186. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF SENIOR CIRCUIT JUDGES, REPORT OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF SENIOR CIRCUIT JUDGES: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 9 (1941).
187. Id.
188. Letter from the Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Criminal Procedure
to the Honorable Harlan F. Stone, Chief Justice of the U.S. (May 23, 1942)
[hereinafter May 23 Letter to Chief Justice Stone], reprinted in 1 DRAFTING
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8(b) provided as follows: “In a case not punishable by death a
defendant represented by counsel may consent that the proceeding be by information instead of by indictment and in that
event the United States attorney may file an information or
proceed by indictment.”189
But despite the provision for waiver of indictment in the
preliminary draft of the rules, questions remained regarding
the constitutionality of the rule. In 1941, William W. Barron of
the Justice Department, which favored the provision for
waiver, described the dissent as such: “Some very conscientious
and literal-minded lawyers see an insurmountable objection to
the proposal. They view the constitutional right to be proceeded
against by indictment as a jurisdictional requirement which
cannot be waived.”190
Questions regarding the constitutionality of the waiver
provision came even from the Supreme Court. Chief Justice
Stone, in offering feedback to the Advisory Committee on the
preliminary draft on behalf of the Court, commented specifically on Rule 8(b): “This rule, authorizing waiver of indictment,
raises questions of policy and possibly constitutionality, which
should be the subject of annotation.”191
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3, 3–5 (Madeleine
J. Wilken & Nicholas Triffin eds., 1991) [hereinafter DRAFTING HISTORY]; May
1942 Preliminary Draft of Advisory Committee, reprinted in 1 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra, at 52, 52–53 [hereinafter May 1942 Preliminary Draft].
189. May 1942 Preliminary Draft, supra note 188, at 52. Rule 8(a) reflected
the waivability set out in Rule 8(b); (“Accusation of an offense which may be
punished by death shall be by indictment. Accusation of an offense which may
be punished by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year or by hard labor
shall be by indictment or, if indictment is waived, by information. Accusation
of any other offense may be by indictment or by information.”).
190. William W. Barron, Proposed Rules of Procedure in Criminal Cases. A
Prosecutor’s Viewpoint, 2 F.R.D. 211, 214–15 (1943) (citing United States v.
Gill, 55 F.2d 399 (D.N.M. 1931); Ex parte McClusky, 40 F. 71 (C.C.D. Ark.
1889); Edwards v. State, 45 N.J.L. 419 (N.J. 1883); People ex rel. Battista v.
Christian, 249 N.Y. 314 (1928)). Barron went on to counter that “[w]e think
the Patton case and the reasoning employed in reaching that decision disposes
of the constitutional objection for the federal courts as it has been disposed of
by some of the state courts.” Id. at 215 (citing Patton v. United States, 281
U.S. 276 (1930), abrogated by Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970)). Barron
also recounted and dismissed concern that a waiver provision would allow influential defendants to persuade prosecutors to proceed by information rather
than indictment. See id.
191. Memorandum from Harlan F. Stone, Chief Justice to Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Chairman Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Criminal Procedure (June
16, 1942), reprinted in 1 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 188, at 11, 15 (emphasis added). The comment went on:
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The Advisory Committee took this and other comments on
the rules and, the following year, produced a new preliminary
draft, accompanied by annotations. In this draft, transmitted
from the committee to Chief Justice Stone on May 3, 1943,192
the language of the Rule read as follows: “An offense not punishable by death may be prosecuted by information if the defendant, being represented by counsel, waives indictment in
writing.”193
Although the changes to the previous draft were, for the
most part, stylistic,194 the annotations shed a good deal of light
on the thinking of the committee. The Note to Rule 8 acknowlOne purpose of the rule, we understand, is to enable a defendant to go
to trial promptly in a division of a district where grand juries sit infrequently. Would that not be possible under [proposed] Rule 22 [providing for the transfer of proceedings, with consent of the defendant,
from one court to another within a judicial district] and, if so, are
there other reasons for the proposal of Rule 8?
Id. at 16; see also ADVISORY COMM. ON FED. RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE (1942), reprinted in 1 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 188, at 70, 70.
192. Letter from Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Chairman Advisory Comm. on Fed.
Rules of Criminal Procedure, to Harlan F. Stone, Chief Justice (May 3, 1943),
reprinted in 1 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 188, at XIII, XIII–XVI. The Secretary of the Committee, Alexander Hotlzoff, had, in September of 1942, prepared a memorandum regarding the desirability of waiver if indictment. See
Memorandum of Alexander Holtzoff on Waiver of Indictment (Sept. 1, 1942),
reprinted in 2 FILES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF CRIMINAL PRACTICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CM-1057 (1942). The memorandum emphasized
only practical considerations and did not attempt to address the constitutional
issues posed by the proposed provision for waiver. See id.
193. FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE PRELIMINARY DRAFT [hereinafter PRELIMINARY DRAFT], reprinted in 1 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note
188, at 27, 28. As with the May 1942 preliminary draft, Rule 8(a) of this draft
reflected the waivability set out in Rule 8(b):
Offenses shall be prosecuted in the district court by indictment or by
information as provided by these rules. An offense which may be punished by death shall be prosecuted by indictment. An offense which
may be punished by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year or at
hard labor shall be prosecuted by indictment or, if indictment is
waived, by information. Any other offense may be prosecuted by indictment or by information.
Id. at 27. Another interesting feature of Rule 8 in this draft can be found in
Rule 8(c), which provided that “[t]he information shall be signed by the attorney for the government and may be filed only by leave of court.” Id. at 28.
194. One major change was the deletion of the language “and in that event
the United States attorney may file an information or proceed by indictment.”
May 1942 Preliminary Draft, supra note 188, at 53 (emphasis added). This
language appears to allow the government to proceed by indictment (and, presumably, avail itself of the compulsory process of the grand jury) even over the
effective waiver of grand jury indictment by a defendant.
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edged that “[t]he present law is not changed by the subdivision
except in the provision . . . . for prosecution of an infamous
crime by information if indictment is waived.”195 In response to
the Supreme Court’s concerns about the constitutionality of the
waiver provision, the committee cited United States v. Gill,196
and argued that the rule, once passed, “would supply the legislative authority considered to be necessary for proceeding by
information in non-capital cases.”197 Thus, the Advisory Committee assumed that a lone 1930s district court opinion more
accurately interpreted the Grand Jury Clause than the consistent approach taken by the Supreme Court and other federal
courts over the prior century and a half.
In May of 1943, the Chief Justice, without critical comment, authorized the Advisory Committee to circulate the preliminary draft of the proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, along with annotations, to both bench and bar.198 The
Rules were discussed at circuit judicial conferences, and comments were received from federal judges, various bar committees (including the American Bar Association) as well as from
government and private attorneys.199 In soliciting such commentary and discussion on the preliminary draft through an
article in the American Bar Association Journal in July of
1943, Arthur Vanderbilt, the Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, commented
specifically on the waiver provision of proposed Rule 8(b), noting that
[e]xpress provision is made to permit the defendant to waive indictment and to consent to prosecution by information. (Rule 8-B.) This
195. PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 193, at 30.
196. 55 F.2d 399 (D.N.M. 1931).
197. PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 193, at 30–31. The note also argues
the necessity of a provision for waiver of indictment, for purposes of expediency and to serve the interests of criminal defendants who would rather commence proceedings than wait for an available grand jury. Id. at 31. Another
interesting note to Rule 8 deals with the rationale for excluding the presentment as a third form of formal accusation. See id. at 32. See generally Renee
Lettow, Note, Reviving Federal Grand Jury Presentments, 103 YALE L.J. 1333,
1337 (1994) (exploring the relationship of presentment and the grand jury in
the early republic).
198. Letter from Harlan F. Stone, Chief Justice, to Arthur T. Vanderbilt,
Chairman, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Criminal Procedure (May 22,
1943), reprinted in 1 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 188, at XVII, XVII–XVIII.
199. Letter from Alexander Holtzoff, Sec’y of the Advisory Comm. on Fed.
Rules of Criminal Procedure, to the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure (Sept. 25, 1943), reprinted in 2–3 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 188, at 362.
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provision is of particular importance in those districts, constituting a
majority, where the grand jury convenes two or four times a year. In
such jurisdictions a defendant who is unable to give bail may be confined in jail for several months awaiting a grand jury to convene although he expects to plead guilty and is anxious for an expeditious
disposition of the case.200

By September 1943, the first round of commentary was circulated to the Committee. The comments, sent primarily from
sitting federal judges and United States Attorneys, overwhelmingly favored the adoption of the provision for waiver of indictment, most for the same reasons put forward by the committee
in the annotations to the proposed rule.201 The second installment of commentary, received by the committee in October of
1943, continued much of the same.202
200. Vanderbilt, supra note 182, at 377; see also James J. Robinson, The
Proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 27 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y
38, 45 (1943). That same summer, former Attorney General Homer Cummings
spoke in support of the proposed rules, describing proposed Rule 8(b) as a
“highly desirable provision” that would help indigent defendants to reduce
time spent in pre-trial detention awaiting indictment, particularly in districts
where grand juries met infrequently. Homer Cummings, The Third Great Adventure, 29 A.B.A. J. 654, 655 (1943) (reprinting the address delivered before
the annual meeting of the Institute on Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure on
August 24, 1943). The talk was thus titled because Cummings considered the
promulgation of the criminal rules the third and final step—following the earlier promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the establishment of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts—toward “a
rounded system of judicial rule-making.” Id. at 654.
201. See COMMENTS TO PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, RULE 8(b) [hereinafter FIRST ROUND COMMENTS TO RULE 8(b)], reprinted in 2–3 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 188, at 65, 65–68. Indeed, many
commentators suggested that even unrepresented defendants should be permitted to waive indictment. See id.
202. See COMMENTS TO PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, RULE 8(b) [hereinafter SECOND ROUND COMMENTS TO RULE 8(b)], reprinted in 2–3 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 188, at 363, 363–66a; Letter
from Alexander Holtzoff, Secretary of the Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of
Criminal Procedure, to the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure (Oct. 4, 1943), reprinted in 2–3 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 188,
at 362. There were a few dissenting voices, however, including those who
thought compliance with the procedural requirements of the waiver rule was
too cumbersome, as well as those who maintained that the rule contravened
the Grand Jury Clause. Nevertheless, the overwhelming tenor of the comments was positive. Interestingly, one of the commentators was Judge Orie L.
Phillips of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, who had authored
the opinion in Gill when he had been a district court judge in the District of
New Mexico. Phillips was as willing to take the credit as he was deserving of
it:
This waiver of indictment is my baby. I started that back in 1923 and
I undertook to start it by first writing a decision in habeas corpus proceedings which was that the defendants could constitutionally waive
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In November of 1943, the Committee transmitted the second preliminary draft of the proposed Rules of Criminal Procedure to the Supreme Court.203 In this draft, the provision for
waiver of indictment was re-titled Rule 7(b) and read as follows: “An offense not punishable by death may be prosecuted
by information if the defendant, after he has been advised of
the nature of the charge and of his rights, waives in open court
prosecution by indictment.”204
Again, the Note to the waiver rule relied solely on the Gill
decision for its constitutionality and stressed the efficiency
benefits of pre-indictment guilty pleas.205 The Note cited
Pound’s Cleveland survey and other surveys, the Wickersham
Commission reports, and the American Law Institute Code for
the proposition that the waiver provision was a much-needed
reform.206
In May and June of 1944, the Committee received installments of comments on the second preliminary draft of the proposed Rules of Criminal Procedure.207 Although many of the
indictment, and that is found in the annotations, here, the case reported in New Mexico.
SECOND ROUND COMMENTS TO RULE 8(b), supra, at 363. Phillips, who made
his comments at an August 24, 1943 American Bar Association meeting on the
proposed rules, reiterated his rationale for the constitutionality of the provision for waiver of indictment:
I don’t think there is any doubt about the constitutionality upon the
basis of the holdings of the courts that the other provisions for the
protection of the defendants, such as the right of trial by common law
jury, right to be confronted with your witnesses and so forth, may be
waived.
Id.
203. See Letter from Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Criminal Procedure
to the Chief Justice and Assoc. Justices of the Supreme Court of the United
States (Nov. 19, 1943), reprinted in 4 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 188, at
XIII–XIV.
204. ADVISORY COMM. ON THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, FEDERAL
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: SECOND PRELIMINARY DRAFT 22 (1944). As
with previous versions of the rule, this proposed Rule 7 required indictment in
capital cases, required indictment in non-capital felony cases in which there
was no waiver, and allowed prosecution by either indictment or information
for all other offenses. Also, the annotations remained substantially the same
as in the first preliminary draft. See id.
205. See id. at 24–25.
206. See id. at 25.
207. See ADVISORY COMM. ON FED. RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, SECOND PRELIMINARY DRAFT (1944),
reprinted in 4 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 188, at III, III–IV; Letter from
Alexander Holtzoff, Sec’y of the Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to the Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Criminal Procedure (May
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comments echoed earlier ones applauding the provision of
waiver for purposes of expediting the criminal process for defendants detained pre-trial in rural areas,208 there were comments again questioning the advisability of the provision. Such
comments ran the spectrum from calling for waiver only when
in written form, to opposing waivability by unrepresented defendants, to doubting the constitutionality of the provision.209
One comment, a “[s]ummary of views of Tennessee Federal
Judges,” set out the views of Judge John D. Martin of the Sixth
Circuit and Judge Elmer Davis Davies of the Middle District of
Tennessee that “it is unwise to disturb a long established
workable practice by a new procedure of doubtful constitutionality.”210

29, 1944), reprinted in 5 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 188; Letter from Alexander Holtzoff, Sec’y of the Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Criminal Procedure, to the Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Criminal Procedure (June 6,
1944), reprinted in 5–6 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 188.
208. See COMMENTS TO THE SECOND PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, RULE 8(B) (Sept. 14, 1943), [hereinafter COMMENTS TO
THE SECOND PRELIMINARY DRAFT], reprinted in 5–6 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra
note 188, at 27, 27–28a.
209. See id. One comment served to undermine the central rationale for the
provision of waiver—expediting the criminal process for defendants who desire
to plead guilty but are detained in districts with infrequent grand jury sittings. Harry C. Blanton, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of
Missouri, who supported the provision of waiver, observed that often in such
outlying districts, judges sit as infrequently as grand juries and, therefore, defendants—who had to waive indictment and plead guilty in open court—“will
have to wait as long as [they] would for a Grand Jury.” See id. at 17. Another
comment, from the Federal Grand Jury Association for the Southern District
of New York, advocated removing the ability of prosecutors to choose whether
a matter can be prosecuted by indictment or information. See id. at 16. Under
the proposed Rule 7(a), non-capital felony cases could be prosecuted by information if the defendant waived indictment and misdemeanor cases could be
prosecuted by either information or indictment. The Association was,
opposed to giving prosecutors, some of whom like to be untrammeled
and are irked by having to defer to a Grand Jury, freedom to do ‘trading’ with accused persons to persuade them that a trial prosecuted by
information would be more to their advantage than a trial prosecuted
by indictment.
Id.
210. COMMENTS TO THE SECOND PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 208, at
27. Perhaps part of the challenge for opponents of the waiver rule was that
they seemed unable to articulate a strong rebuttal to the practical arguments
being advanced by the pro-waiver reformers. Instead of merely resting upon
the jurisdictional heritage of the grand jury, a better strategy might have been
to argue that, even in a modern criminal justice system, protection for individual defendants might better be served by enhancing the role of grand jury
rather than diminishing it.
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In June of 1944, the final report of the Advisory Committee
on the Rules of Criminal Procedure was issued with the final
draft of the rules, with the language for provision of waiver of
indictment remaining unchanged from the previous draft.211
The Rules were transmitted to Attorney General Francis
Biddle by Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone in December of 1944212
and Biddle submitted them to Congress in January of 1945.213
Ultimately, the advocacy on the part of the judges and the
bar bore fruit. With the adoption in 1946214 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure came a provision for waiver of indictment in non-capital felony cases:
Rule 7. The Indictment and the Information.
(a) USE OF INDICTMENT OR INFORMATION. An offense which
may be punished by death shall be prosecuted by indictment. An offense which may be punished by imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year or at hard labor shall be prosecuted by indictment, or if indictment is waived, it may be prosecuted by information. Any other
offense may be prosecuted by indictment or by information. An information may be filed without leave of court.
(b) WAIVER OF INDICTMENT. An offense which may be punished
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year or at hard labor may
be prosecuted by information if the defendant, after he has been advised of the nature of the charge and of his rights, waives in open

In addition to speaking of the ways short of waiver in which, as noted
above, the grand jury process might be altered to avoid lengthy pre-indictment
detention of defendants, waiver opponents might have pointed out the pressures that could be brought to bear upon an unsophisticated defendant to have
him or her waive indictment and plead guilty to a charge of the prosecutor’s
choosing rather than have the grand jury pass upon the merits of any such
charge. Such coercion would not be possible where the grand jury indictment
is treated as a jurisdictional prerequisite. Furthermore, those opposed to the
waiver rule might have tried to counter the broader philosophical argument
being made by the reformers—that the grand jury was no longer a useful tool
for protecting individual liberty. In response to this anti-grand jury argument,
defenders of the grand jury might have gone on the offensive, arguing that not
only should we decline to diminish the grand jury’s role in criminal procedure,
but we should make it more robust.
211. See Letter from Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Criminal Procedure
to the Chief Justice and Assoc. Justices of the Supreme Court of the U.S. (July
1944), reprinted in 7 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 188, at 13, 13.
212. See Letter from Harlan F. Stone, Chief Justice, to Francis Biddle, Attorney General (Dec. 26, 1944), reprinted in 7 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note
188, at 125, 125.
213. See Letter from Francis Biddle to the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America (Jan. 3, 1945), reprinted in 7 DRAFTING
HISTORY, supra note 188, at 123, 123.
214. The Rules went into effect on March 21, 1946.
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court prosecution by indictment.215

With regard to the issue of constitutionality, the Note to
Rule 7(b) cited United States v. Gill for the proposition that the
“constitutional guaranty of indictment by grand jury may be
waived by [the] defendant,”216 and pointed to “other constitutional guaranties [that] may be waived by the defendant,”217 including trial by jury, right to counsel, protection against double
jeopardy, privilege against self-incrimination, and confrontation of witnesses.218
With its formal authorization to the government to proceed
by information in the face of an effective waiver of indictment
by a defendant in a felony case, Rule 7(b) of the new Federal
Rules removed the final impediment to the waiver of grand jury
indictment. After the rules went into effect in March of 1946,
initial reports were that the waiver provision performed its intended function, improving efficiency of the federal criminal
process and allowing certain defendants to avoid preindictment incarceration.219
215. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7 (1946). The Advisory Committee Notes accompanying Rule 7(b) explained that:
Opportunity to waive indictment and to consent to prosecution by information will be a substantial aid to defendants, especially those
who, because of inability to give bail, are incarcerated pending action
of the grand jury, but desire to plead guilty. This rule is particularly
important in those districts in which considerable intervals occur between sessions of the grand jury. In many districts where the grand
jury meets infrequently a defendant unable to give bail and desiring
to plead guilty is compelled to spend many days, and sometimes many
weeks, and even months, in jail before he can begin the service of his
sentence, whatever it may be, awaiting the action of a grand jury.
ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, NOTES TO THE RULES
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES,
reprinted in 7 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 188, at 244, 244.
216. ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, NOTES TO THE
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED
STATES, reprinted in 7 DRAFTING HISTORY, supra note 188, at 245.
217. Id.
218. Id. The Note to Rule 7(b) also pointed out that “[t]he Federal Juvenile
Delinquency Act now permits a juvenile charged with an offense not punishable by death or life imprisonment to consent to prosecution by information on
a charge of juvenile delinquency.” Id. at 244. See generally Recent Statutes, 38
COLUM. L. REV. 1318 (1938) (discussing the constitutionality of the Federal
Juvenile Delinquency Act).
219. See SURRENCY, supra note 62, at 283; Tom C. Clark, An Indorsement
of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 5 F.R.D. 305, 306 (1946) (describing a
case in which a federal defendant in New Mexico—where the grand jury sits
only twice a year—was arrested just following a grand jury session and saved
himself six months in jail by waiving indictment under the new Rule 7(b) and
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Rule 7(b) represented a triumph of the anti-grand jury,
criminal law reform, and, ultimately, the legal realist efforts of
the early twentieth century to adapt criminal procedure to the
realities of the time. Despite the well-established “jurisdictional
heritage” of the federal grand jury, these reformers were able—
without having to amend the Constitution—to remove a key
obstacle to the more efficient disposition of criminal cases. In
doing so, the reformers were able to further their efforts to
eradicate the tendency of adjudicatory criminal procedure “to
worship form at the expense of justice.”220 However, in the case
of the relationship between grand jury indictment and jurisdiction, the formalism of the nineteenth century discarded by
these pro-waiver efforts concerned not mere antiquated judgemade procedure, but the perceived mandate of the Fifth
Amendment’s Grand Jury Clause.
IV. TOWARD RECONCILIATION OF THE
JURISDICTIONAL HERITAGE OF THE
GRAND JURY AND ITS MODERN ROLE
This Article has sought to critique the modern understanding of the right to grand jury indictment for its unjustified dismissal of the grand jury’s jurisdictional heritage, which was obscured—but not countered—by the criminal procedural reform
movement of the early twentieth century. Although the issue of
constitutionality and jurisdiction was glossed over in the rulemaking process of the 1940s, the waiver provision was widely
perceived both as efficient and as protecting defendants against
periods of uncharged detention,221 and the constitutional objections raised during the rulemaking process eventually melted
away.222
The question remains: why is this important? What does it
matter that nineteenth century courts saw grand jury indictment as a jurisdictional prerequisite? Perhaps we have received
describing a case in Massachusetts that was completed in 4.5 hours); Alexander Holtzoff, Changes in Federal Criminal Procedure, 6 F.R.D. 277, 279 (1947)
(describing effective use of the rule by defendants in Wyoming, New Mexico,
and the District of Columbia); see also Lester B. Orfield, Two Years of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 21 TEMP. L.Q. 299, 310 (1948) (“The provision for waiver has reduced the number of grand juries called in 1947, the
number of days of service of the grand juries, and the cost to the government
of bringing witnesses before the grand jury.”).
220. Perkins, supra note 125, at 300.
221. See supra Part III.B.
222. See SURRENCY, supra note 62, at 203.

FAIRFAX_4FMT

2006]

12/22/2006 11:01:15 AM

JURISDICTIONAL HERITAGE

449

all we can expect from the Court on this question. Presumably,
the Supreme Court could have chosen not to acquiesce in the
promulgation of Rule 7 in 1946, or it could have chosen to use
one of the many federal criminal cases it has heard in the past
sixty years to strike down Rule 7 as violative of the Grand Jury
Clause. And, indeed, a reasonable reading of Cotton and even
other cases where the rule was cited in passing could be seen as
an implicit endorsement of the notion that grand jury indictment is not a jurisdictional prerequisite.
So why is further consideration of these questions important? An easy answer is that the current understanding of the
relationship between grand jury indictment and jurisdiction is
based on flawed history and analysis, which must be corrected.
In addition, there is reason for concern that the criminal procedure reformers were able to use the rulemaking process to sidestep a clear constitutional mandate in the name of efficiency.
Historical accuracy and constitutional fidelity are important
values. By themselves, they warrant an examination of how we
arrived where we are today. But, there are additional reasons
to explore this issue.
First, the failure to reconcile the modern approach with the
jurisdictional heritage of the grand jury has spawned confusion.
Even though federal courts since the promulgation of the FRCP
have been uniform in their uncritical acceptance of the constitutionality of indictment waiver, courts have struggled with
how to deal with defective indictments in light of the grand
jury’s jurisdictional heritage. Second, there is some movement
on the part of the Supreme Court to return to fundamental constitutional principles and to adopt a more formalist or originalist approach to certain criminal procedural rights. Questions
arise regarding whether the Court will look again to the jurisdictional heritage of the Grand Jury Clause, and what that examination could mean for procedural efficiency tools like preindictment plea bargaining. Finally, the process of examining
and accounting for the jurisdictional heritage of the grand jury
can provide valuable insights into the role the grand jury is
meant to play in our constitutional structure.
A. LINGERING CONFUSION OVER THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
GRAND JURY INDICTMENT AND JURISDICTION, AND THE
CONTINUED VITALITY OF BAIN
Although the Rule 7 waiver debate had been all but conceded by the second half of the twentieth century, the continu-
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ing vitality of Bain and its progeny has been apparent in modern judicial decisions. Perhaps due to the specious nature of the
constitutional rationale for the waiver provision, the grand
jury’s jurisdictional heritage continues to live on as both the
Supreme Court and lower courts continue to recognize—
through their treatment of forfeited claims related to fatally
flawed indictments—that there remains some nexus between
grand jury indictment and a court’s exercise of jurisdiction over
a criminal matter. The Court, in Cotton, vastly overstated the
case when it said that Bain had been disproved by later cases
in the twentieth century. Indeed, aside from the reform-driven
promulgation of Rule 7 and a decision that narrowed Bain in
the context of proof and pleading questions,223 Bain and the jurisdictional heritage it represented were alive and well at the
time Cotton was decided.224
In 1960, the Supreme Court, in Stirone v. United States,
was presented with the question of whether a defendant can be
convicted on allegations that, though closely related to those in
the indictment, were not themselves charged.225 The Court said
of Bain: “The Bain case, which has never been disapproved,
stands for the rule that a court cannot permit a defendant to be
tried on charges that are not made in the indictment against
him.”226 Two years later, in Russell v. United States, the Court
again seemed to confirm the vitality of Bain as a general matter, describing the case as the “settled rule in the federal courts
that an indictment may not be amended except by resubmission to the grand jury, unless the change is merely a matter of
form.”227 Although the Court again had no occasion in Russell
to address the issue of the constitutionality of waiver, it quoted
with approval Bain’s description of the Grand Jury Clause’s
223. The 1985 case of United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130 (1985), partly
overruled Ex parte Bain: “To the extent Bain stands for the proposition that it
constitutes an unconstitutional amendment to drop from an indictment those
allegations that are unnecessary to an offense that is clearly contained with it,
that case has simply not survived. To avoid further confusion, we now explicitly reject that proposition.” Id. at 144.
224. Indeed, during oral argument in the Cotton case, Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that “it isn’t [clear] in our cases so far, that the kind of error,
whatever it is, doesn’t qualify as, quote, jurisdictional.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002) (No. 01-687), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument_transcripts/
01-687.pdf.
225. 361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960).
226. Id. at 217.
227. 369 U.S. 749, 770 (1962).
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“‘prerequisite of an indictment’” as “‘the restriction which the
Constitution places upon the power of the court.’”228
Aside from never being fully overturned by the Supreme
Court prior to Cotton, Bain and the jurisdictional heritage it
represents were regularly relied upon by lower federal courts
exploring the impact of indictment defects upon their jurisdiction in criminal cases. A review of the cases leading up to the
Cotton decision provides compelling evidence that the jurisdictional heritage of the grand jury was being recognized even at
the turn of the twenty-first century. The federal reporters are
replete with cases throughout the latter half of the twentieth
century, relying upon Bain and reaffirming its central premise
that a valid grand jury indictment is a mandatory prerequisite
to a court’s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over a criminal case.229 Even while acknowledging the waivability of the
right to grand jury indictment under Rule 7, courts subscribed
to the view that “‘the lack of an indictment in a (federal) felony
case is a defect going to the jurisdiction of the court.’”230
Following the 1999 Apprendi decision, appellate courts
were flummoxed by the question of whether an Apprendi error
in a federal indictment affected a court’s jurisdiction. Some
courts, such as the Tenth Circuit, rejected the notion that an
indictment failing to include all the elements of an offense was
jurisdictional in nature.231 Other courts, including the Fourth
228. Id. (quoting Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 13 (1887), overruled by United
States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002)).
229. See, e.g., Crosby v. United States, 339 F.2d 743, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1964)
(“The scope of the indictment goes to the existence of the trial court’s subjectmatter jurisdiction.” (citing Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. at 12–13; Stirone, 361
U.S. at 213.)); see also United States v. Montgomery, 628 F.2d 414, 416 (5th
Cir. 1980) (“‘Unless there is a valid waiver, the lack of an indictment in a (federal) felony case is a defect going to the jurisdiction of the court.’” (quoting
WRIGHT, supra note 54, § 121, at 522)); United States v. Macklin, 523 F.2d
193, 196 (2d Cir. 1975) (“The absence of an indictment is a jurisdictional defect
which deprives the court of its power to act.” (citing Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S.
417 (1885); Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1)); United States v. Choate, 276 F.2d 724,
728 (5th Cir. 1960) (“[L]ack of indictment goes to the court’s jurisdiction.”);
Colson v. Smith, 315 F. Supp. 179, 182 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (noting that lack of indictment deprives the court of jurisdiction while uncritically acknowledging
the validity of indictment waiver); United States v. Anzelmo, 319 F. Supp.
1106, 1125 (E.D. La. 1970) (referring to jurisdiction).
230. Montgomery, 628 F.2d at 416 (quoting WRIGHT, supra note 54, § 121,
at 213).
231. See United States v. Prentiss, 256 F.3d 971, 981 (10th Cir. 2001). But
see United States v. Tran, 234 F.3d 798, 808–09 (2d Cir. 2000) (limiting the
scope of the court’s subject matter jurisdiction to an offense charged in the in-
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Circuit, held squarely that a valid grand jury indictment was a
mandatory prerequisite to subject matter jurisdiction under
Bain and its progeny.232 Still other courts were divided on the
question; the Eleventh Circuit had a split panel with two
judges holding that “the constitutional right to be charged by
grand jury indictment simply does not fit the mold of a jurisdictional defect, because it is a right that plainly may be waived”
under Rule 7,233 while a third judge on the same panel asserted
that “an indictment found by a grand jury [i]s indispensable to
the power of the court to try [the defendant] for the crime with
which he was charged.”234
Lest anyone take false comfort from the Cotton Court’s
flawed historical analysis, the fact remains that Bain has retained its vitality. The Court never definitively resolved the
constitutionality of waiver of indictment. The reformers were
able to establish waivability of indictment through the rulemaking process and by making arguments about efficiency, but
the core view that there is a relationship between grand jury
indictment and jurisdiction lived on in other contexts right up
until the Supreme Court decided Cotton. Due to the uncertain
foundation of the waiver rule and the failure of the Court to
address directly the jurisdictional heritage of the grand jury,
confusion lingers—confusion that obscures our understanding
of the role of the grand jury.
B. REALISM AND FORMALISM, PRAGMATISM AND ORIGINALISM
It is necessary, therefore, to reconcile, in a principled and
reasoned way, the jurisdictional heritage of the grand jury with
our desire for efficiency in the criminal process. By sweeping
this jurisdictional heritage under the rug, the reformers and
the Supreme Court have failed to take into account the intended role of grand jury indictment in our system. A more
comprehensive understanding might lead to consideration of
dictment), overruled by United States v. Thomas, 274 F.3d 655 (2nd Cir. 2001).
232. See United States v. Cotton, 261 F.3d 397, 404 (4th Cir. 2001), rev’d,
535 U.S. 625 (2002); see also United States v. Longoria, 259 F.3d 363, 365 (5th
Cir. 2001) (“The grand jury’s issuance of an indictment is what gives federal
courts jurisdiction to hear a case and impose a sentence.”), rev’d en banc, 298
F.3d 367 (5th Cir. 2002) (reversing course after the decision in Cotton).
233. See McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1249 (11th Cir. 2001).
234. See id. at 1263 (Barkett, J., concurring in result only) (“‘[A]n indictment found by a grand jury [i]s indispensable to the power of the court to try
[the defendant] for the crime with which he was charged.’” (quoting Ex parte
Bain, 121 U.S. at 12–13) (second and third alterations in original)).
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how to make the grand jury a more robust protection of individual liberty as well as an effective tool for the investigation of
criminal activity. By avoiding the question of how to reconcile
the jurisdictional heritage of the grand jury with the modern
quest for criminal procedural efficiency, the rulemakers and
the Supreme Court have left the grand jury requirement in legal limbo. If it is not a jurisdictional requirement, what is it? If
it is a jurisdictional requirement, how is waiver constitutional?
It might seem that the promulgation of Rule 7 represented
the triumph of realism over formalism, and that the realist
criminal procedural reform project succeeded in sidestepping
the constitutional issue, thereby demeaning the grand jury and
rejecting it as a fundamental protector of liberty. Recent cases
have demonstrated, however, that the Supreme Court sometimes returns to the origins of constitutional provisions and to
fundamental principles.235 A future Supreme Court might be
persuaded to return to formalism or originalism in determining
whether the right to grand jury indictment is of jurisdictional
import.
Cotton, to be sure, was a pragmatic decision—both in the
way it echoed the legal realist view of the grand jury right and
because of its conscious avoidance of the havoc that a contrary
decision would have wreaked in the short term, given the uncertainty surrounding the implications of the Apprendi decision.236 The Court undoubtedly was concerned about the impact
that the contrary conclusion—that grand jury indictment was,
indeed, a mandatory prerequisite to a court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a criminal case—would have had on the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts. Fearing an
avalanche of similar challenges to sentences under indictments
that did not charge the crime for which the defendant was sen-

235. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005); Blakeley v.
Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36
(2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
236. See, e.g., Toby J. Heytens, Managing Transitional Moments in Criminal Cases, 115 YALE L.J. 922, 948–50 (2006). For a definition of legal pragmatism (and a comment on some difficulties in defining it), see RICHARD POSNER,
OVERCOMING LAW 11–15 (1995). See generally STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005); RICHARD POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRACY (2003); Daniel A. Farber, Legal
Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Richard A.
Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1996).
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tenced, the Court may have felt compelled to preserve appellate
courts’ ability to apply plain error or harmless error review.237
However, a truly profound—if unintended—consequence
would have been the concomitant weakening of the foundation
of pre-indictment plea bargaining. To re-open the question of
whether grand jury indictment can be waived without divesting
a court of jurisdiction might have meant the beginning of the
end of federal pre-indictment guilty pleas. Over ninety percent
of convictions in adjudicated criminal cases in federal district
courts come by way of guilty plea.238 Elimination of the availability of pre-indictment pleas, although only a subset of that
number, would negatively impact the ability of the federal district courts to process the more than sixty-seven thousand
criminal case filings each year.239
In this way, Cotton can be read as the pragmatic recognition of the same concerns that animated the realist project’s attack on the grand jury. The view that the right to grand jury
indictment is nothing more than a personal privilege of the
criminal defendant, unrelated to structural considerations, is
certainly a common thread. Practical concerns of efficiency undergird the modern understanding just as they did the realist
reform project. Driven by pragmatic concerns about Apprendi
challenges to indictments like the one the Court faced in that
case, and, perhaps, the broader and more calamitous problem
of potential challenges to pre-indictment guilty pleas, the Cotton Court made a weak argument against the jurisdictional
heritage of the grand jury, based upon revisionist historical
evidence and flawed reasoning.
237. A fair argument can be made that the pro-jurisdictional heritage decision may have had minimal impact for purposes of Apprendi-type indictment
errors. First, federal prosecutors responded immediately to Apprendi by including sentencing enhancement facts in grand jury indictments, thus making
the indictments immune to the type of challenge pressed in the Cotton case.
Second, at least in its early refinements, Booker, the case which ultimately
applied Apprendi’s core teaching in the federal context, does not require grand
jury indictments to include sentencing factors, although a careful prosecutor
might include them anyway. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 761–62; id. at 780 n.10
(Stevens, J., dissenting); 2 BEALE, supra note 35, § 8.1 (noting that recent
precedent may require prosecutors to include aggravating factors in their indictments).
238. See Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in
Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 96 (2005); Federal Justice
Statistics,
Summary
Findings,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/fed.htm#
Adjudication.
239. See, e.g., Judicial Business of the United States Courts (2002),
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2002/appendices/d00sep02.pdf.
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The danger in the Court’s pragmatic approach displayed in
Cotton is that it may have begun to give way to an originalist
approach in a closely-related area of criminal procedure.240 Recent scholarship has highlighted the ways in which a majority
of the Court has been persuaded to apply an originalist and
formalist approach in the area of criminal procedural rights.241
Whether a trend is afoot is debatable.242 In any event, the willingness of a majority of the Rehnquist (now Roberts) Court to
apply originalist approaches to constitutional criminal procedural protections is certainly worth recognition. Should the
originalist approach extend to the grand jury context, a future
court may be inclined to re-examine the question of whether
the grand jury right is a jurisdictional prerequisite such that
waiver of indictment or allowing fatal defects to the indictment
would unconstitutionally violate the Grand Jury Clause.243
240. For some attempts to define the contours of originalism, see ROBERT
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
133–267 (1990); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 37–47
(1997); Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 IND. L.J. 1, 20–35 (1971); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57
U. CINN. L. REV. 849, 851–65 (1989). See also 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 47; Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365 (1997); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993).
241. See Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183, 184 (2005); Rachel E. Barkow, Originalists, Politics,
and Criminal Law on the Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV.1043 (forthcoming 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=910563.
242. Professor Bibas points out that the use of originalism in one of the two
cases he examines, Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), in applying
the Apprendi logic to state sentencing guidelines, was not as straightforward
as might appear on the surface. Bibas observes that, in Blakely, the record
was anything but definitive with regard to the history of the Article III and
Sixth Amendment Jury Clauses. See Bibas, supra note 241, at 195–96. Also,
Bibas notes that a true fidelity to originalism in Blakely settled for “half an
originalist loaf ” by leaving intact waiver of jury trial which, although essential
to modern day plea bargaining, fairly clearly contravenes the mandate of the
Jury Clause of Article III. See id. at 197.
243. An originalist resort to text and history may very well lead to the conclusion that the fulfillment of the right to grand jury indictment is a mandatory jurisdictional prerequisite that would make, for example, pre-indictment
plea bargaining unconstitutional much like a true originalist approach to the
right to jury trial would render all plea bargaining unconstitutional. Bain, the
decision standing for the proposition that the Grand Jury Clause is a jurisdictional mandate, has been described as a quintessential originalist decision:
It is never to be forgotten that, in the construction of the language of
the Constitution here relied on, as, indeed in all other instances
where construction becomes necessary, we are to place ourselves as
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Given the clear and undeniable evidence of the jurisdictional heritage of the grand jury and the questionable constitutional rationale for the indictment waiver provision, the modern understanding is inadequate and must be revisited.
Precisely because plea-bargaining is a necessity in our federal
criminal justice system, for example, it is imperative that it
rest upon a firmer constitutional foundation than that which
the Court has supplied. In addition, although Booker on its face
does not compel federal prosecutors to include enhancement
factors in indictments,244 this view could change, and the Court
and lower courts reviewing indictment challenges on that basis
would be forced again to come to grips with Cotton’s weak rationale. Furthermore, unanticipated developments in the recognition of criminal procedural rights could expose the soft underbelly of the Court’s approach.245
nearly as possible in the condition of men who framed that instrument. Undoubtedly the framers of this article had for a long time
been absorbed in considering the arbitrary encroachments of the
crown on the liberty of the subject, and were imbued with the common-law estimate of the value of the grand jury as part of its system
of criminal jurisprudence. They, therefore, must be understood to
have used the language which they did in declaring that no person
should be called to answer for any capital or otherwise infamous
crime, except upon an indictment or presentment of a grand jury, in
the full sense of its necessity and of its value.
Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887), overruled by United States v. Cotton, 535
U.S. 625 (2002); see also Michael J. Gerhardt, A Tale of Two Textualists: A
Critical Comparison of Justices Black and Scalia, 74 B.U. L. REV. 25, 30–31
(1994); Kevin C. Newsom, Setting Incorporation Straight: A Reinterpretation of
the Slaughter-House Cases, 109 YALE L.J. 643, 696 (2000). An interesting
query is why the Cotton decision earned the vote of Justice Scalia. Possible explanations are that Scalia was of the mind that a contrary result was not required by an originalist approach—the text and history of the Grand Jury
Clause do not provide sufficient certainty to warrant the conclusion that grand
jury indictment is a jurisdictional prerequisite. Another possibility is that, in
the words of Professor Bibas, there was no “half an originalist loaf ” to take
from Cotton, and the full loaf—which arguably would entail abolishment of all
waiver of grand jury indictment, including pre-indictment plea bargaining—
was far too expensive. Bibas, supra note 241, at 197.
244. See supra Part I.
245. This Article is not a general call for an originalist approach to interpreting criminal procedural protections in the Constitution. However, we must
ensure that our historical understanding of these protections is sound as we
interpret and apply them to our modern situation. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies,
What Did the Framers Know and When Did They Know It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 107 (2005) (disputing
the Court’s characterization of the “original meaning of the Confrontation
Clause”). Also, it is, to say the least, a good idea to get questions of jurisdiction
correct. Because limits on a court’s power to entertain a case serve a number
of important functions in our constitutional democracy—such as separation of
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Therefore, it makes sense to determine whether a more
dynamic interpretation of the Grand Jury Clause’s mandate
might yield the same result as the pragmatic approach, but, at
the same time, respect the jurisdictional heritage of the grand
jury and the implications that history has for the way we can
improve it today.
C.

LESSONS LOST, LESSONS TO BE LEARNED

Aside from the lingering confusion and the vulnerability of
the modern understanding is the fact that the grand jury as an
institution could benefit from a thorough consideration of its intended role in the constitutional system. To discard the jurisdictional heritage as mere historical novelty in order to reap
practical benefits would be to ignore over a century of jurisprudence rich with guidance for re-examining what the modern
grand jury could and should be and how it could and should
best serve our democracy.
If the grand jury protection was important enough to be enforced through a restriction on the judicial power, what does
that tell us about the effectiveness of the grand jury today?
Have we allowed the grand jury to stray so far from its supposed function that the Grand Jury Clause demands a correction of course? Perhaps the jurisdictional treatment of the right
to grand jury indictment was as much about restraining prosecutorial power as it was about restraining judicial power. If this
is the case, then waiver and forfeiture rules promoting efficiency might be less obviously “good” than we have assumed.
The Supreme Court adopted the pragmatic view without critical examination of the jurisdictional heritage of the grand jury
and has failed to confront the reason why the Fifth Amendment
was written to contain a Grand Jury Clause. As a result, our
understanding of the grand jury has suffered.
By the end of the twentieth century, many in the American
legal community—judges, attorneys, and scholars alike—were
content with the illogical position that grand jury indictment is
a mandatory prerequisite to a court’s jurisdiction, but that a defendant could waive the right to grand jury indictment. Although the availability of waiver of grand jury indictment may
be desirable from an efficiency standpoint, it is of paramount
powers, federalism, and individual liberty—we should be ever-vigilant to ensure continued fidelity to constitutional strictures. See, e.g., Howard M.
Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643, 649–50, 650 n.30
(2005).
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importance that we obtain a firm grasp on the principles that
define the role of both the grand jury as well as the indictment
in the pantheon of criminal procedural rights, particularly at a
time when the closely-related right to a jury trial is enjoying a
new vitality. The Court’s uncritical acceptance of the pragmatic
approach has squandered the opportunity to critically examine
and to clarify the relationship between the grand jury and jurisdiction. Much work remains to be done. The acknowledgement of the grand jury’s “jurisdictional heritage” is an important first step in the long-overdue project of taking inventory of
the grand jury and its place in the constitutional framework of
our criminal justice system.
CONCLUSION
The modern rejection of the grand jury’s jurisdictional
heritage is largely without basis. Once we move beyond the fiction that the grand jury has no jurisdictional significance, a
number of interesting questions emerge. How do we square
that robust view of grand jury indictment with the nonincorporation of the grand jury right to the states, and should
that question be revisited? Does the jurisdictional heritage of
the grand jury place any restrictions on the extent to which we
can implement much-needed reforms to the grand jury? Does it
mandate that we implement reforms that make the grand jury
a more effective protection of individual rights?
In this age when the institution of the grand jury has lost
the respect of much of the legal profession and, perhaps, the
citizenry, it may be difficult to imagine the grand jury as a robust jurisdictional prerequisite to the exercise of federal criminal jurisdiction. To be sure, the jurisdictional heritage of the
grand jury has been obscured by twentieth century pragmatic
efforts at criminal procedural reform; however, it has never
been sufficiently disproved.
A far superior approach would acknowledge the jurisdictional significance of the grand jury and balance it against
practical considerations in a way that enhances both efficiency
and liberty. Rather than sweeping under the rug for practical
purposes the relationship between the grand jury and jurisdiction, we need to reclaim that heritage and determine how it
might help us decipher the role the grand jury is supposed to
play in our constitutional system and what might be done, in
compliance with the Constitution, to enhance the quality of
criminal justice in the United States.

